カテゴリー: 研究レポート

                            by Philippe Valdois, FRSA

Indo-Pacific and Belt and Road Initiative

In the following essay, I will examine the concerns expressed by the U.S. government in answer to the growing presence of China in the Indo-Pacific, in particular with its Belt and Road Initiative and to what Washington considers Chinese infringements of intellectual property rights. I will consider the validity of those concerns and the possibility that Washington’s reactions are partly motivated by some other factors outside of the usual field of geopolitics. Finally, in the context of a brewing trade conflict, as of mid-August 2018, we will see how the U.S. are engaging into a new strategy to counter Chinese ambitions, quite different from the isolationism advocated by President Donald Trump, while Beijing sets itself apart from the U.S. by focusing as part of its diplomacy with Chinese characteristics on “making contributions to the building of a community with a shared future for humanity.”

The Indo-Pacific as an Area of Increasing Strategic Significance

When looking at world maps, we see the Indo-Pacific encompassing almost two-thirds of the planet. Does it make sense to assign to such a vast zone a similar or greater strategic importance as compared with the Asia-Pacific? I would respond in the affirmative based on various factors. As a side note, the U.S. Navy, as a mobile force active in securing passageways for commercial shipping, has always understood the strategic importance of two communicating oceans. In fact, the area of responsibility of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) already encompassed most of the Indian Ocean before it was rebranded from United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) on 30 May 2018. It is true that the majority of the countries West of the Indo-Pacific, including in Africa, do not have a capacity to project into the Indian Ocean. Evidently, the same could also be said of many countries of the Pacific Rim. However, to help us understand why the Indo-Pacific occupies a growing place in discussions about international trade and security, we only have to look at India and China and the growing role they will play in the future in the region. The Australian 2013 Defence White Paper published in 2013 already stated it clearly:

China’s continued rise as a global power, the increasing economic and strategic weight of East Asia and the emergence over time of India as a global power are key trends influencing the Indian Ocean’s development as an area of increasing strategic significance. In aggregate, these trends are shaping the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic arc.

Elsewhere in the document, we are told that “Growing trade, investment and energy flows across this broader region are strengthening economic and security interdependencies.” One key word is “interdependencies”. In my opinion, it reflects the reality that only recently and by necessity a U.S. administration focused on bilateral negotiations, or one-on-one “deals” as favored by Donald Trump, started to recognize. There are other factors motivating investments in the region. On the positive side, the regional players, after the devastating 2004 tsunami, discussed ways to respond to catastrophes and improve communications. There has been also talks and initiatives about fighting piracy off Somalia and securing the transportation of Chinese products to Europe with China sending its Navy ships to the region and later opening a base in Djibouti. It seems, therefore, that the U.S. cannot claim it has, with its allies, the monopoly of securing free maritime trade routes. China’s plans to open multiple naval bases close to India, in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, etc., are, however, a matter of concern.

 Growing Power and Influence of China-The Belt and road Initiative

There is no doubt that Beijing is a major player in the Indo-Pacific. As China’s influence grows, concerns are being expressed by other countries, focusing not only on China’s trade ambitions in general and projection of military power in the South China Sea, but more specifically on the Belt and Road initiative (BRI). French medias sometimes translate Belt and Road Initiative as “Nouvelle Route de la Soie” when it should be “Routes” as a variety of development corridors are planned or being established between China, Europe and Africa, including roads, railways and maritime routes with the necessary port infrastructures. We can also mention that Belt refers to the ancient Silk Road and Road to sea lanes including the ancient maritime silk road. It is an ambitious foreign policy launched in 2013 under the name “one belt, one road”.  69 countries have signed up and China is now spending more than $100 billion a year in investments, mainly infrastructure ones. China needs to attain a new level of development and the BRI helps to that effect by serving the country’s economic interests. Both in terms of importations and exportations, better and faster transportation means lower costs and lower prices. If the BRI opens new markets for China, it also helps secure food for delivery to a growing Chinese population. 

Reactions to the BRI and validity of concerns

In an article published on 26 June titled “China’s Belt and Road Initiative paved with risk and red herrings”, the authors explained how common criticisms of the BRI were flawed. However, they point at “empirically supportable objections to the BRI”. Among them are the regional insecurities associated with the projection of military power, both in the South China Sea and in the countries implicated in the BRI eager to see their debts forgiven in exchange for equity in strategic infrastructures control, such as ports and consequent militarization of the region. Another issue is that if the outlines of the initiative are clear, there are no default rules or procedures concerning loans. As the authors say “case-by-case bilateral negotiations with China seem to be the default option” when rules and transparency are most needed with a project on such a large scale.    

The U.S. government tends naturally to focus on the perceived negative aspects of the BRI, but the BRI might have a positive impact on sustainable development and the natural environment as the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road published by the Chinese ministries of Foreign Affairs and Environment in May 2017 shows. Since the beginning of Donald Trump administration, isolationism and the quasi-religious fervor with which the America First movement has been used as a guide for trade policies and environmental policies (with the announcement the U.S. would withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change) have antagonized Washington’s allies. I anticipate therefore that this document will be used in promoting Chinese green technologies in the dozens of countries implicated in the BRI.  

As boycott campaigns targeting foreign products and anti-foreigner protests have shown, Beijing is willing and able to orchestrate such events domestically and put a break to them when and where necessary, relying on contemporary history to exacerbate nationalistic feelings. However, those tactics are not limited to Continental China and its citizens.

As Amy Qin explained in the August 5, 2018 issue of the New York Times online, “China has become increasingly assertive in its efforts to appeal to the vast Chinese diaspora to serve the country’s national interests and gain influence abroad.” She gave us as examples the mobilization of local groups in Western countries in support of Chinese policies regarding Taiwan or Tibet.

Should it be surprising then that countries with an important ethnic Chinese population become suspicious of any attempt by Beijing to promote Chinese identity and culture based on blood, or when Xi Jinping talks about “Chinese sons and daughters at home and abroad” blurring as Amy Qin explained, the distinction between nationality and ethnicity?

If the U.S. is not talking about a fifth column, it is nonetheless increasingly looking for potential spies. Similarly, Donald Trump argues that China is stealing U.S. intellectual properties to justify the opening of a trade war. Fortunately, other less destructive tools are being put to work to counter the growing influence of China in the Indo-Pacific. On the diplomatic front, the U.S. is holding so-called “2+2 meetings” at the Foreign Affairs and Defense minister level with Australia, Japan and India. In addition, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech titled “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” on 30 July 2018 in Washington in which he announced plans to increase U.S. public and private investments. The $113 million mentioned pale in comparison to the hundred billion of dollars being invested by China as part of its BRI. However, this engagement would serve as a catalyst for more private U.S. investments in the region, which in turn would lead to more clarity and “honesty” regarding contracts and deals than what could be expected from Beijing. It also helps showing other countries that isolationism is not the only policy chosen by Washington. 

In their May 20, 2018 article published in The National Interest “How China Plans to Dominate the Global Economy: Copy America”,  Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang gave us a lesson in history, telling us that “the infringement of intellectual property will fuel economic development” until, in the words of China scholar Frederick Abbott“the country reaches the point where IPR protection becomes economically advantageous to a sufficiently strong set of domestically vested interests.” The authors also reminded us that both the U.S. and Japan went through the same process.

Also, as an observer of American politics and history, I see parallels, in this Trump era, between the deep if not openly expressed fear of the White man to lose his dominant status to expanding minorities, domestically, and the fear of seeing America lose his position in the world, an event or fall that would negate what its citizens had been made to believe under the ideology of American exceptionalism. As we have seen previously, there is also in China a form of exceptionalism instrumentalised by the government in its efforts to rally the support of the Chinese diaspora. However, as the U.S. reacts to fear and a possible loss of status, China is developing a positive long-term strategy of making both its huaqiao citizens abroad and huaren ethnic “sons and daughters” proud and united. If the Chinese initiative might remind us of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) Donald Trump’s campaign slogan, there is no doubt that behind the latest, fear of uncertainty and other negative and divisive feelings are brewing. We also cannot ignore the fact that Donald Trump’s message is addressed to and received as such by less than 50 % of the U.S. population.

From a European humanistic perspective, it is difficult to find any merit in the kind of nationalism expressed by both the Chinese and American powers that be, where exceptionalism, military might and dominance are used a benchmark for greatness. However, Chinese President Xi Jinping, in a major speech on 23 June 2018 clarified China’s major country diplomacy addressing two key themes: “…focusing on realizing Chinese nation’s rejuvenation and promoting human progress, and making contributions to the building of a community with a shared future for humanity.” It is to be seen if the U.S. have been or will be receptive to this long-term vision. However, even if the issues of human rights and “debtbook diplomacy” keep being debated, Europe will see in this effort the recognition by China of the importance of a multipolar, interconnected world, and one more illustration of the position adopted by China both in a phone call to French President Emmanuel Macron in May 2017, concerning the Paris Agreement, and at the Boao Forum for Asia about globalization and free trade in April 2018.

Photo: Chinese freight train from Wuhan to Moscow, Hubei Govt.

 

                            by David Parmer / Tokyo

 

The 19th National Congress of The Communist Party of China was held from 18-24 October 2017 in the Great Hall of The People in Beijing. Thousands of delegates from all over the country descended on China’s capital to participate in the CPC’s most important event, its 5-year meeting, to assess its performance in the past 5 years and to set out a strategy and vision for the next 5 years.

This meeting’s keynote was a report delivered on behalf of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. The speech gave a detailed summary of both past performance and future vision.

 Prior to the convening of the meeting, speculation was rife in the world media about what would take place during the 5 days of the meeting, who would move up and who would move down or out. Much talk centered about Mr.Xi’s allies being in the ascendency.

Many analysts commented on Mr. Xi’s consolidation of power and many noted that he was now the most powerful leader in China since Mao Zedong himself. Some wondered if a “cult of personality” would arise around him, and one commentator went so far as to claim that this event was the “coronation of Emperor Xi.” (Time, 24 October 2017 / online edition).

Ignoring this type of speculation, the question then is why has Mr. Xi been so focused on consolidating power, fighting corruption, retiring old cadres and promoting young and capable cadres and reforming the military?

The answer is rather straightforward, and that he is determined to do as much as possible in his time in office to make his vision of the China Dream and the rejuvenation of the nation a reality.

 

The theme of the Congress is: Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation (Preamble to Mr. Xi’s report)

As was pointed out by several commentators after the event, Mr. Xi’s vision of the future while containing important points dealing with the rest of the world and China’s relation to it, is really focused internally.

As first glance the achievement of a “moderately prosperous society” would seem to be a key element is his vision, but on closer examination, the completion of national rejuvenation seems to be the real “true North” at which all of China’s compass needles must point according to Mr. Xi’s vision of a greater China.

In this paper we will start by taking a brief look at some of the key points in Mr. Xi’s report to the19th Congress that are central to his vision for a future China up to the middle of this century and beyond.

In the second section we will use a powerful and effective marketing tool or template to examine the challenges and opportunities that face Mr. Xi, the Party, and China itself.

The marketing tool is called a PEST analysis, with the letters standing for Political, Economic, Social, and Technological. Typically, company management at the highest levels uses this tool to plan their long-terms strategy, especially in the field of marketing. PEST analysis shows how the prevailing factors are for or against the organization’s plans.

In the October Mr. Xi has laid out his grand plan for China in front of the 19th Congress of the CPC. The purpose here is not to attempt to suggest whether Mr. Xi’s plan will “succeed” or “fail,” but rather what factors will affect it. We will use the PEST analysis to see where he might be faced with a restraining headwind, or a favorable tailwind, or both at the same time.

         Section One – Xi Jinping’s Vision for China

Mr. Xi’s vision for a moderately prosperous society employing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to create a New Era.

In Mr. Xi’s report to the 19th Congress consisting of 32,000 characters and lasting for some 3 hours, Mr. Xi first pointed out where progress had been made in the past 5 years. He and then set out his grand vision for China to 2035, 2050 and beyond. These grand goals included:

• The creation of a moderately prosperous society
• The continuation of reform and opening up
• The creation of a world-class military that is fully capable
• The emergence of China as a global leader
• The maintenance of “one country, two systems” and the 1992 consensus
• The continued fight against, and elimination of corruption
• The creation of a “green China” that opposes global warming
• The elimination of poverty by 2020
• The completion of national rejuvenation

A short explanation of each section in Mr. Xi’s own words from his report to the 19th Party Congress:

 

(A) The creation of a moderately prosperous society

Building on this, our Party then developed the vision that by the time we celebrate our centenary, we will have developed our society into a moderately prosperous one with a stronger economy, greater democracy, more advanced science and education, thriving culture, greater social harmony, and a better quality of life.

 

(B) The continuation of reform and opening up

We should pursue the Belt and Road Initiative as a priority, give equal emphasis to “bringing in” and “going global, follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, and increase openness and cooperation in building innovation capacity. With these efforts, we hope to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea.

(C) The creation of a world-class military that is fully capable

We must fully implement the Party’s thinking on strengthening the military for the new era and the military strategy for new conditions, build a powerful and modernized army, navy, air force, rocket force, and strategic support force, develop strong and efficient joint operations commanding institutions for theater commands, and create a modern combat system with distinctive Chinese characteristics

(D) The emergence of China as a world leader

We will pursue open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits everyone; boost cross-cultural exchanges characterized by harmony within diversity, inclusiveness, and mutual learning; and cultivate ecosystems based on respect for nature and green development.

(E) The maintenance of “one country, two systems” and the 1992 consensus

We have fully and faithfully implemented the principle of “one country, two systems,” and ensured that the central government exercises its overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong and Macao as mandated by China’s Constitution and the basic laws of the two special administrative regions.

We have upheld the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, promoted the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, strengthened cross-Straits economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation, and held a historic meeting between the leaders of the two sides

(F) The continued fight against, and elimination of corruption

The people resent corruption most; and corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces. We must have the resolve and tenacity to persevere in the never-ending fight against corruption. Only by intensifying efforts to address both the symptoms and root causes of corruption—by making sure that officials are honest, government is clean, and political affairs are handled with integrity—can we avoid history’s cycle of rise and fall and ensure the long-term stability of the Party and the country.

(G) The creation of a “green China” that opposes global warming

We have devoted serious energy to ecological conservation. As a result, the entire Party and the whole country have become more purposeful and active in pursuing green development, and there has been a clear shift away from the tendency to neglect ecological and environmental protection

(H) The elimination of poverty by 2020

We must ensure that by the year 2020, all rural residents living below the current poverty line have been lifted out of poverty, and poverty is eliminated in all poor counties and regions. Poverty alleviation should reach those who truly need it and deliver genuine outcomes.

(I) The completion of national rejuvenation

National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since modern times began. At its founding, the Communist Party of China made realizing Communism its highest ideal and its ultimate goal, and shouldered the historic mission of national rejuvenation

 

Section Two – PEST Analysis of Mr. Xi’s Vision

 

Mr. Xi’s report contains a myriad of issues and challenges, however the above sections can be considered as the key points of his vision. The next task will be to take a look at these points and see what forces will support or oppose their realization.

 

                                   POLITICAL FACTORS

                                   Favorable Conditions

 

From a political standpoint, Mr. Xi has been working on his agenda for the past 5 years. The 19th Party Congress saw a group of new leaders step forward and take their places in the Politburo Standing Committee, and this might be considered the culmination of the beginning of the full implementation of the China Dream. Mr. Xi now has the support he needs for the ambitious agenda he has outlined, and which was foreshadowed in the achievements of his first 5 years including:

 

• The launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
• The Belt and Road imitative
• The ongoing modernization of the PLA
• The ongoing and vigorous fight against corruption

Few observers fail to comment on the accumulation of power that has taken place in the first 5 years of the Xi administration. However most commentators seem to view this accumulation of power as a matter of personal ambition on Mr. Xi’s part, and not as the basis for his drive to accomplish the goals outlined above.

 

                                   Unfavorable Conditions

 

• Tibet nationalism
• Uighur nationalism
• Hong Kong activism
• Taiwan Independence activism
• The rise of India to world-power status
• The continued but diminished US Asian influence

 

While China is in effect a one-party system, the CPC is not without its opposition. The first of these would be minority opposition in the form of Tibetan and Uighur nationalism. Neither of these problems looks like it will diminish soon. The second form of opposition to the CPC comes in the form of activists in Hong Kong and independence activists in Taiwan. On the latter Mr. Xi has made his policies clear; that China will continue to support the “one country, two systems” policy, and will abide by the 1992 Consensus on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. While progress toward a moderately prosperous society with Socialist characteristics will move forward, it will do so in spite of these adverse internal currents.

Internationally, China faces most of the same challenges as the majority of the other countries in the world face, i.e. the threat of terrorism, the march of global warming, and the ever-changing, inter-related global economy.

China also faces some thorny issues with its neighbors. From the Chinese perspective, China is only trying to secure its borders as one facet of national rejuvenation as propounded by President Xi. Moreover, China feels it has given repeated assurances that it does not seek hegemony in the region. However, from the perspective of China’s neighbors, with whom she is in dispute (Japan, Vietnam, Philippines) in the East China Sea and South China Sea, China looms large and is a real threat to their territorial sovereignty.

Two other major political challenges threatening China’s realization of the China dream take the form of its neighbor India and its cross-Pacific rival, the Untied States.

India today could be described, as China once was, i.e. as “a sleeping giant.” India has many, many of its own challenges to overcome until it becomes a moderately prosperous society. With the growth of its economy, infrastructure and military power India will surely become one of China’s main rivals.

Border disputes have flared up over the last 50 years, and will probably continue to do so. From a certain point of view India has suffered repeated humiliations in these confrontations and has had to repeatedly back down or settle for a stalemate at best where the Chinese side held all the cards. When a resurgent India has some real military muscle, it will be another question as to whether India will back down again.

As for the sea, if it can be said that the East and South China seas are a Chinese lake, then all signs point to the potential that the Indian Ocean will become an Indian pond in the not-so-distant future.

Chinese shipping from the Gulf transits the Indian Ocean and enters the Strait of Malacca in Indian-influenced waters. India has already stepped up its patrol and base building in order to cover this vital transit point. Submarine activity is increasing through the East Asian region and the Indian Ocean is no exception.

Nor can China fail to factor in its trans-Pacific rival, the United States in its plans for the future. The United States, somewhat diminished is still the most militarily powerful nation on the planet with the ability to project power anywhere in a timely manner. Moreover, the US has honed its military edge for 16 years fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and supporting counter-terrorism from the Arctic to Africa with its cooperation and training missions.

The United States Navy while it is currently having operating problems is still the mightiest naval force in the world with 19 aircraft carriers to China’s 2

The US has ships, bases and allies in the Asia-Pacific, and there is no indication that this will change its Asia-Pacific strategy in the foreseeable future despite a policy of looking inward and pulling back which seems to be the worldview of the Trump administration. China will have to pursue the China Dream in this century and beyond with its American rival still in place and still strong.

 

                                Economic Factors

                               Favorable Conditions

 

“China has entered a new normal in economic development.”

 

In his opening remarks to the 19th CPC Congress, Mr. Xi outlined the measures taken and challenges ahead for China to move to a “moderately prosperous society.” These include:

• Promotion of further Internet integration
• Promotion of new area of growth
• Supporting additional industries in upgrading
• Improving the supply chain
• Encouraging entrepreneurship
• Cutting excess capacity and cut cost
• Vigorously continuing to promote opening up
• Continuing and expand Belt and Road Initiative
• Opening China’s western regions
• Empowering free trade zones
• Making China a country of innovators
• Pursuing rural revitalization
• Fostering regional development

Mr. Xi’s “new normal” aims to take China from an economy of fast growth to high-quality development. In the past 5 years a lot of groundwork has ben laid to make this happen, and to make the development goals listed above a reality.

Internationally, as the US retreats, China steps forward. China’s Belt and Road plan already has several parts in place and is moving forward. As with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China is and will continue to get wide support for it visionary approach to its own and the regional and global economy.

China will end the calendar year of 2017 with some good news for its economy; her GDP is expected to come in at 6.8%, a figure higher than targeted. This has exceeded expectations and marked a 7-year high. GDP is estimated at 6.4% for 2018, but the numbers could also be higher in December 2018.

                                 Unfavorable Conditions

Economically, China has some strong headwinds blowing against her as she moves forward. Many of the issues were addressed by Mr. Xi in his opening address, however simply acknowledging and addressing them does not means they are solved.

One of the major problems is China’s increasing debt. It has been reported that debt stands at 234% of GDP. In 2017, Standard & Poor’s downgraded China’s credit rating to A+ because of debt and financial risk.

Other challenges for China are problematic state intervention in the economy, low productivity of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and continued support of loss-making companies. China also needs to do more to control soaring housing prices. The IMF suggests that China must also speed up reforms and boost consumption. Right now there is a situation of high national savings and low consumption.

It is not all bad news for the giant Chinese economy, but Mr. Xi and his government have their work cut out for them when it comes to the economy moving forward in the next 5 years and beyond.

 

                                    Social Factors

 

                                Favorable Conditions

 

 

In a normal PEST analysis, the “S” or social component would probably have equal importance with the other three factors. In this study of Xi Jinping’s speech to the 19th Party Congress, however, the social factor is really the most important. This is because while the speech addresses China’s external interests and concerns, it is primarily focused on domestic matters, i.e. creating the Xiaokang, or moderately prosperous society and national rejuvenation.

Mr. Xi’s speech is really about what has been done, and what must be done by all members of the CPC and the Chinese nation. Some of the things that have been done, and must continue to be done include:

• Maintaining a medium-growth economy
• Building infrastructure to include highways, ports and airports
• Continuing to increase the number of legal migrants to cities
• Continuing to promote democracy and rule of law
• Improving social security for urban and rural people
• Continuing to build an ecological society
• Eliminating poverty and eliminating rural-urban imbalance

The next big target is 2020 with the finishing of the building of a moderately prosperous society and the elimination of poverty. The next phase is from 2020-2035, and the final phase is from 2035-2050 when the socialist modernization of the nation will have been realized. This will complete the rejuvenation of the nation.

Mr. Xi offers planning for the road ahead and calls for all to cooperate in the building and realization of the China Dream.

 

                                   Unfavorable Factors

The realization of the China Dream is on track and moving forward, but that does not mean that it will not meet adverse conditions before the 2050 target for completion.

Domestically the CPC party center could face opposition from Tibetan and Uighur nationalism. These two ethnic groups must be dealt with properly to prevent both an increased sense of separatism and terrorism. Beijing’s response must be both firm and fair, and these (and other) minorities must feel a sense of inclusion in the Chinese nation and Chinese dream. Hong Kong and Taiwan are also problematic for the central government.

Thus far, Beijing has dealt with Hong Kong skillfully in the 20 years since the former British colony has reverted to Chinese control. Mr. Xi in his speech has reiterated the Party’s commitment to the “one country, two systems” arrangement. The worst-case scenario is a robust opposition movement that would cross some undefined “red line” and ultimately force Beijing’s hand. The best-case scenario is the passage of time where a new generation of young people has a different “China consciousness” and loyalty to greater China.

As for Taiwan, Mr. Xi also reiterated the Party’s commitment to the “1992 Consensus” affirming the one-China policy. He also stated unequivocally that not “Taiwan Independence” movement would be tolerated. The problem with Taiwan is that while the possibility of a growing “China consciousness” is possible in Hong Kong as a solution, it does seem not possible with Taiwan. Polls have repeatedly shown that Taiwan people more and more see themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese. At present, there seems to be only two solutions to the Taiwan question: toleration or takeover. No third solution is currently on the table. So Taiwan will remain one piece missing from the mosaic of “rejuvenation of the nation.” Until it is “solved” it will be a problem for China and an “incomplete.”

International factors that could slow down the realization of Mr. Xi’s great blueprint would include tensions or open conflict with China’s Russian and Indian neighbors. Also to be considered would be the possibility of unwanted conflict with China’s maritime neighbors including Japan, Viet Nam, the Philippines and the United States. War on the Korean peninsula would also certainly cause a re-thinking of the great timeline forward.

While the above considerations would not derail the China Dream, they could slow it down considerably and force the CPC to adjust its timelines for 2020, 2035 and 2050.

 

                                         Technological Factors

                                          Favorable Conditions

 Probably the greatest impetus for the development of Chinese technology is not scientific but a commitment to national rejuvenation. In his speech Xi Jinping mentions the Opium War of 1840 which began a century of national humiliation for China. China was poorly armed and no match for the premier military of its day, the British army and navy. China’s complacency in the 18th century left it vulnerable to European powers that had embraced the Industrial Revolution. China had a long, uphill battle to modernize. After 1949 China had not only to reconstruct but also to start to build a livable society.

 Both Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enliai fully understood that it was science and technology that would move China forward. When Deng went to Japan and saw the technological prowess of the postwar Japanese he was determined to move China forward scientifically and militarily. So began Reform and Opening Up and the development of China’s tech sector. Today China has a robust space program, a space station of its own, a giant program to develop alternative energy, a massive and vibrant Internet infrastructure, and is committed to assuming leadership in the fight against global warming and climate change.

 

In his speech Mr. Xi states:

 

Through devoting great energy to implementing the innovation-driven development strategy, we have seen much accomplished toward making China a country of innovators, with major advances made in science and technology, including the successful launch of Tiangong-2 space lab, the commissioning of the deep-sea manned submersible Jiaolong and of the five-hundred-meter aperture spherical telescope (FAST) Tianyan, the launch of the dark matter probe satellite Wukong and the quantum science satellite Mozi, and the test flight of the airliner C919.

Mr. Xi makes it clear that it will be technology that will be the underpinning for the development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, the completion of the China Dream and the Chinese national rejuvenation.

 

                                   Unfavorable Conditions

 It is hard to imagine any conditions unfavorable to the development of China technologically. It is unlikely that China will waver in its commitment to excel on the scientific and technological fronts. The target of having basically achieved full development by 2050 will not likely be abandoned. The only real threat would be military conflict with one or several of its potential adversaries or war on the China mainland itself. Either war or planetary disaster seems to be the only forces capable of slowing China’s technological and scientific advance.

                                            CONCLUSION

Using the PEST analysis of Mr. Xi’s speech we can come to a few common conclusions among the sections. We can see that his consolidation of power is not a move towards personal aggrandizement, but rather the next necessary step to the realization of his vision. The strength of Mr. Xi’s plan for a greater China in the 21st century lies in these factors,

• Vision
• Commitment
• Planning
• Implementation

Factors that will militate against the China Dream are as mentioned above,

• Ethnic unrest
• Hong Kong unrest
• The Taiwan question
• Border conflict with neighbors
• Conflict in the East and South China sea
• War on the Korean peninsula

If Mr. Xi’s call is heard by the CPC and supported by the Chinese people, then the China Dream, and a fully realized country featuring Socialism with Chinese characteristics will  likely become, despite inevitable setbacks, a reality by 2050.

Photo: Global Times

 

 

 

            David Parmer

The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan are separated by the Taiwan Strait, a body of water 180 km wide that connects the East China Sea with the South China Sea. But the gulf that sets them apart politically is immeasurable, and is widening every day. On the mainland, the PRC has taken a firm position on “One China” policy that seems to be hardening by the month, while Taiwan, thanks to the emergence of constantly and ever-deepening sense of Taiwanese identity, particularly among the younger generation, seems to be simply drifting away. In this article we will take a look at these two positions, and try to imagine where they could lead, and what possible positive outcomes, if any, may be possible.

 

1. The Fixed and Unchanging Position of the PRC

What is China’s position on Taiwan? Is there an authoritative and definitive short answer to that question? Yes, there is, and it is supplied by none other than the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mr. Xi Jinping. In his 2014 book, The Governance of China, Mr. Xi states explicitly, emphatically and unequivocally China’s position on the status of Taiwan:

“For more than six decades now, although the two sides have yet to be reunited, we belong to one country and the same nation – a fact that has never changed, nor will ever change in the future. The blood of the Chinese nation flows in every one of us, and ours is forever the soul of the Chinese nation.”

“…the two sides must consolidate and hold fast to our common foundation of the ‘1992 Consensus’ and our opposition to ‘Taiwan independence,’ and be fully aware of the importance of maintaining the one-China framework. Such a foundation is the anchor for cross-Straits relations.”

“As far as any significant political differences between the mainland and Taiwan re concerned, we are willing to conduct consultations with the people of Taiwan based on equality within the one-China framework, and come to reasonable arrangements.”

(Speech delivered on February 18, 2014 when receiving Lien Chan, Honorary Chairman of the Kuomintang of China and his delegation.)

Another unequivocal presentation of the position of the PRC can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Under the heading “A policy of ‘one country, two systems’ on Taiwan.” the ministry states:

“Taiwan is a sacred and inseparable part of China’s territory…

In January 1979, Deng Xiaoping advanced the concept of “one country, two systems” and stated that “so long as Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland, we will respect the realities and the existing system there.” On September 30, 1981, Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, officially put forward a nine-point proposal for bringing about the peaceful reunification of the mainland and Taiwan. He said that “after China is reunified, Taiwan may become a special administrative region. It may enjoy a high degree of autonomy and may keep its military forces. The national government will not intervene in the local affairs of Taiwan.” “Taiwan’s current social and economic systems will remain unchanged, its way of life will not change, and its economic and cultural ties with foreign countries will not change.’ “

Taiwan’s future lies in its reunification with the motherland, and attempt to split China will never be accepted as an alternative. Li Denghui and a small number of people in Taiwan who betray the principle of one China and advocate the creation of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” in an attempt to split China are doomed to failure as they will surely run into the firm opposition of the entire Chinese people including the people of Taiwan. To accomplish China’s reunification is the trend of the time and common aspiration of the entire Chinese people across the Taiwan Strait. With the joint efforts of the entire Chinese people including the compatriots in Taiwan, the day will certainly come when China is reunified.”

Here is a third, recent statement of resolve on the part of the PRC. The following exchange is taken from a PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) press briefing on May 26, 2016 by Senior Colonel Yang Yujun:

Question: Recently, Tsai Ing-wen assumed office as the leader of Taiwan region. In her inaugural speech, she didn’t clearly recognize the 1992 Consensus and acknowledge its core essence. Rumor has it that the PLA is going to hold large-scale military exercises aiming at deterring “Taiwan independence” forces. What is your comment?

Answer: On the question you have raised, like what was said by the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on May 20, we are today as determined as ever and more capable to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will resolutely contain any action and attempt by the secessionists for “Taiwan independence“. (Emphasis added)

From the above material we can get a clear and unambiguous understanding of the position of the PRC, the key points being:

• Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory
• The one-China 1992 consensus must be adhered to
• The PRC will accept no other course of action than re-unification
• A “one country, two systems” arrangement is possible for Taiwan
• Any unilateral declaration of Independence will be met with force

Viewed from the standpoint of best practices in negotiations, parties to a negotiation make the best results when they focus on shared interests rather than on strong positional negotiating.

In President Xi’s book, The Governance of China, we can see him hinting at shared interests when he suggests that both the PRC and Taiwan will benefit from better cross-Strait relations and both will share in the prosperity of a resurgent China. However, from the above bullet points we see that the PRC has taken several strong positions that it sees as non-negotiable.

China’s inducements to Taiwan for unification, then, include a share in the prosperity of China, a Hong Kong-style “one country two systems” arrangement, and the satisfaction of final unification with the motherland.

China’s negative inducements include isolation on the international stage by co-opting Taiwan’s few international allies, restrictions on travel and business, and the threat of the use of military force.

1. The Changed Reality on the Other Taiwan Side of the Strait

                   The Emergence of the Taiwan Identity

On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, in Taipei and throughout the country, perceptions of Taiwan-PRC relations are somewhat different. While the PRC assumes it is dealing with a static entity, i.e. the Republic of China, the situation is changing almost daily. The biggest element is the constant and ever-evolving sense of a Taiwan identity. The existence of the Taiwan identity is not new, and even President Xi Jinping acknowledges it.

In The Governance of China, President. Xi writes:  

“Due to their historical suffering and the distinct social environment in which they have lived, the people of Taiwan have their own mindset. They bear particular historical scars, they are eager to be masters of their own destiny, they cherish their established social systems and way of life, and they wish to live a stable and happy life. Putting ourselves in their place we can full understand their feelings.” (Together Fulfill the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, Feb. 18, 2014).

The PRC, however, does not seem to be aware of the current meaning, extent and implications of the Taiwan identity and how it is changing the equation.

On the mainland, Taiwanese are seen as Chinese, but on the island, the perception is not only more nuanced, but is in constant flux. And this changed perception has profound implications for any discussion of reunification with the mainland.

On May 28, 2016, the Taipei Times reported a poll in which:

More than 80 percent of respondents self-identified as Taiwanese, compared with 8.1 percent who identified themselves as Chinese and 7.6 percent who identified as both in the poll, whose wording asked respondents if they viewed themselves as “Taiwanese,” “Chinese” or had “other thoughts.”

This 80% identification with being Taiwanese can be seen as a major factor in the sweeping victory enjoyed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Tsai Ing-wen that swept into power both in the presidency and in the legislature in the January 2016 elections. Consistent with this is the assertion made by many observers that voters felt the pan-blue KMT was becoming too close to the PRC, and that the traditionally independence-minded DPP would better represent them.

The article went on to state:

When asked to choose between eventual independence and unification with China, more than 51 percent said they favored independence, while 15 percent favored unification and 25 percent favored maintaining the “status quo.”

(Taiwan Times, May 28, 2016)

                 The Fading of the Kuomintang, KMT

What the election also showed is that the Kuomintang, KMT is morphing into simply another (albeit robust) Taiwan political party, and is no longer a viable government-in-exile. Twenty-first century realpolitik and the voters of Taiwan seemed to have relegated the Republic of China to the history books.

These days, the fiction of the Republic of China, as either the legitimate government of all China, or there being any chance that all China, from Harbin to Hainan, will fall under its dominance, is wearing extremely thin.

During the early stages of the Cold War, American conservatives urged their government to “unleash Chaing Kai-shek” for re-conquest of the mainland. Those days are long gone.

                             The “1992 Consensus”

This being said, how can there be any substance to the “1992 consensus”?

From a certain point of view the “1992 consensus” is an agreement made between the PRC and an entity that is now simply another Taiwan political party. Although not stated explicitly, it may be that the DPP-led Tsai Ing-wen government sees itself as what the Japanese call “dai-san-sha” i.e., a third party, to the “1992 consensus.”

So what purpose does the “1992 consensus” have today? It is a working agreement that gives all parties “breathing room.” It is a face-saving fiction that permits all parties to pursue their interests without forcing a confrontation.

             No Outright Endorsement by Tsai of 1992

Considering the above, is it any wonder that Tsai Ing-wen, in her inaugural speech did not endorse the “1992 consensus outright?

What Tsai did say was informative:

Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.

The new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation. The two governing parties across the Strait must set aside the baggage of history, and engage in positive dialogue, for the benefit of the people on both sides.

By existing political foundations, I refer to a number of key elements. The first element is the fact of the 1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), when there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common ground. This is a historical fact. The second element is the existing Republic of China constitutional order. The third element pertains to the outcomes of over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait. And the fourth relates to the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.

The question here is while Tsai references the Republic of China, does she believe in it, or is it simply an outmoded framework, an old vehicle that the owner must drive until she can afford to go to the car dealership and purchase a newer model?

                     Maginot-Line Thinking About Taiwan

And here is the point: pundits, journalists and scholars (and it seems even certain sections of the PRC government itself) have focused, with tunnel vision, on the question of Taiwan independence. This is reminiscent of France’s defense against Germany in the early 1940s–the Maginot Line. The Maginot line was a series of fixed defenses facing Germany whose guns could only be operated in one direction. As we know from history, that during the invasion of France, the German Wehrmacht simply went around the Maginot Line.

Likewise, “the experts” are focusing on formal Taiwan Independence, and like the French Republic in the 1940s they are looking the wrong way in a fixed and inflexible manner

Put another way, they are looking for a mechanical event, i.e. the outright declaration of Taiwan independence. What is actually happening is an organic and evolutionary event, the deterioration of the Republic of China (ROC) and the emergence of a country called Taiwan.

 

                            Taiwan’s Organic Evolution

 

“History will remember our courage. It will remember that in the year 2016 we took this country in a new direction.” (Tsai Ing-wen, Inaugural Speech)

It is incredible that so many people have read and commented on Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural speech and simply missed the content by focusing on cross-Strait relations with a magnifying glass. It is as if they willfully refused to hear or understand the contents of her speech.

 

In that speech, President Tsai called for a new Taiwan society, a 21st century society that addresses current problems and looks to the future. In the speech Tsai listed a number of areas that need attention to move Taiwanese society forward and the solutions that her administration would put in place. What she laid out were a series of measures to make Taiwan more prosperous, more just and more livable for its citizens.

She began by defining the problems faced by Taiwan:

• Low birthrate
• Environmental pollution
• Poor fiscal situation
• Lack of confidence in the judicial system
• Inadequate food safety standards
• Wealth disparity
• Less than optimal social welfare system
• Low wages for young people

She then offered a menu of solutions for a 21st century Taiwan:

• A new model for sustainable development
• A new “Southbound Policy”
• Promotion of 5 industries to improve global competitiveness
• Care for resources and curb pollution
• Strengthen social security net including pension reform
• Establish a Truth and Reconciliation commission
• Promote judicial reform
• Address regional peace stability and development
• Manage cross-Strait relations
• Maintain existing dialogue under the 1992 agreement
• Proactively participate on the world stage
• Be a partner for the international community

 

What the speech outlines is Tsai’s bold plan for a new Taiwan society and a government that is organized to serve its citizens. Will the DPP’s plan be perfectly implemented? Time will tell. What we can grasp from the speech is the direction that Taiwan is heading and its priorities. From the speech it seems that Taiwan’s priorities are:

• Domestic issues relating to a prosperous and sustainable society
• Cross-Strait relations with the PRC and the 1992 Consensus
• Taiwan’s role on the international stage

What is not contained in the speech is any mention at all of Taiwan independence or any “return to the motherland.”

Her speech tells us that Taiwan is looking in many directions, and the view across the Strait is just one of them.

                     Adjusting to the New Reality

 So, quite the opposite of opposing the status quo, the DPP seems quite content to have it continue. As the status quo continues, so does the evolution of Taiwan from being the Republic of China, to simply being a nation called Taiwan. This evolution can neither be slowed down nor stopped under existing conditions. As long as Taiwan and the DPP do not declare formal independence, it looks like China, in the short term, will take no forceful action, such as an invasion of Taiwan.

Let us return to our opening pages where China’s position was spelled out.

• Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory
• The one-China 1992 consensus must be adhered to
• The PRC will accept no other course of action than re-unification
• A “one country, two systems” arrangement is possible for Taiwan
• Any unilateral declaration of Independence will be met with force

If China holds these positions in an inflexible manner, then the question becomes: What can China do, and what will China do?

Supposing that Taiwan does not take any precipitous action, e.g. declaring independence or even promoting independence outright­–which would result in military action on the part of the PRC– what courses of action are open to the PRC?

           When Push Comes to Shove–A Timetable for Return

From the PRC point of view, this situation has dragged on, unresolved, for more than 70 years. The 1992 Consensus and the status quo are just stopgap measures, but they cannot continue forever.

For the PRC, then, the only answer would be a timetable for return. And this timetable could take two forms:

1. A) A timetable agreed upon by the PRC and ROC which would probably be under the “one country, two systems” arrangement.

(This scenario would be much more likely should the KMT return to power in Taiwan, and there were warming cross Strait relations such as those promoted by the KMT’s President Ma during his term in office.)

1. B) An unilateral timetable put forward by the People’s Republic with a deadline.

In this scenario, the PRC would claim that a failure to come to the negotiating table on the issue of a timetable for return would be seen as a de-facto declaration of independence by Taiwan. (And actions to curb “Taiwan secession” would be put in motion.)

In the coming years, the DPP might disappoint the voters, be involved in all sorts of scandals, and not deliver on Tsai’s magnificent promises, and consequently be voted out at the next election. This would make Plan A, above possible.

On the other hand, Tsai and the DPP might remain popular, or become even more popular, and be voted in for a second term. In which case, the current stalemate will continue, but as just mentioned, from Beijing’s standpoint, the situation cannot continue forever.

What will it take for China to implement Plan B? Right now China has a lot on her plate including the South China Sea issue, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Add to this North Korea and China’s slowing and evolving economy. What’s more, the intermittently-friendly Russian bear is always sniffing about on her northern border.

So what would trigger Plan B? The most likely would be a set of circumstances where China’s perceived national interest would call for the immediate return of Taiwan and for which the PRC would be willing to pay the highest price in terms loss of life, national treasure, and negative international reaction.

                               A Better Solution? Plan C

One solution that has been already rejected by the PRC in the case of Tibet, would be an extension of the “one country, two systems” model. If the PRC were to form a Commonwealth of China, or a Chinese EU, and grant economic flexibility and autonomy to Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan in a kind of European Union, it would eliminate the problems it has with those four regions–immediately. It would have four strong allies on its flanks instead of having each of them like a stone in its shoe. Since “return to the motherland” has not been defined in minute detail, it may be the one point where the PRC has a chance to act in its own self-interest in a flexible manner.

 

This federated-China solution might be the one attractive option that would bring a DPP/ pan Green Taiwan to the table. The PRC can hope for a Plan A (above) and force a Plan B (above) or think outside the box and implement some form of Plan C.

Whatever the choice, it is time that all parties start to look at cross Strait relations in terms of reality and not ideology, sentiment or emotion.

 

Photo:威翰 陳 via flickr

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                   Bill Lee

1.なぜ米国と日本は中国に圧力をかけるのか

言うまでもなく東シナ海（以下ECS)と南シナ海（SCS）で、中国の優勢を妨げるのは日米に重要な目的に違いない。経済の面でECSの豊かな魚や石油の資源が日本には重要であり、SCSの航路が米国にも不可欠である。(5.3兆ドルのSCSにより貨物の中で米国のシェアは１．２兆ドル)。安全保障の面では、ECSに於いて日米は中国の琉球諸島により、太平洋へのアクセスを妨害できる。SCSに於いてフィリピンやインドネシアにより太平洋とインド洋への中国のアクセスをブロックできるし、どうしても米国はSCSの深海の中の中国の潜水艦の往来を阻止したいのである。

2.米国にて政治的な展望

これから米国と日本にて政治的な展開は中国に関しての対応が大分に変わってくる見込みである。次のアメリカの大統領次第に米国の外交、経済、安全保障の政策は違った道に進む可能性が大である。クリントン候補者は当選すればどれぐらいアジアへの中心軸の位置が（pivot)Obama政権の政策を継続するか不明であるがほぼクリントン夫人は、大きく外れることはないと考えられる。日米同盟を強化するはずのクリントン夫人は、尖閣諸島が攻撃されれば日米安全保障条約の適用対象になるとはっきり声明したことがある。

それに反してトランプ候補者は、矛盾や非論理的な発言だらけで彼の政策の立場が分かりづらく、これだ！というトランプ氏の立場は不明である。経済の面でトランプ氏は中国のいわゆる「為替操作」について批判しているがそうした発言は選挙のポーズだと受け止められる。トランプ氏の知識不足が明らかになるのは、「中国が入っていないTPPは、中国への賄賂だ」という最近の発言である。中国人が自分の住宅用不動産を購入していると自慢しているし、もしかしたら経済の面でトランプ氏は中国と利益のある関係を継続したいではないか。安全保障の面でトランプ候補者の当選は中国には有利な結果だと言っていいであろう。トランプ氏は、世界での米国の軍事的な存在を低下したいと主張し、日本や韓国にさらなる安全保障面での負担を増やして欲しいと発言。「つい最近私の側近が、日本は基地の費用を５０％で負担していると教えてくれたけどなぜ１００％を負担していないのか？」とトランプ氏は言った。

安全保障条約についてトランプ氏は：「日本が攻撃されればアメリカは、日本を全面的に守らなくてはいけない。しかしアメリカが攻撃されたら、日本人は何もせずに、家でソニー製のテレビを見るだけだろう。」と話した。トランプ氏は大統領になったら米国は自国防衛のために負担を増やすよう、日本に圧力をかけるに違いない。長い実業家としての経験にもとづいて自分の交渉の能力を自慢しているトランプ氏は、ビズネス交渉を国際政治や安全保障に、そのトリックを適用しようとするはずである。しかし、誰にでも分かる戦術の一つは、交渉の初期段階で、自分側の１番極端の立場を見せるのである。日本との交渉で、アメリカは退場する（「walk」)構えではないとダメだ、とトランプ氏は八月五日に言った。その「walk」という言葉は、米軍基地が日本から全部を撤退するという意味である。おそらくトランプ氏も含めて誰も彼の頭の中の考えが分からない。彼の矛盾発言の一例は、核不拡散についての質問に対して、トランプ氏は一文の中で「核不拡散にすればいいが、日本と韓国は核兵器を持つべきかもしれない。」トランプ氏は、日米間に亀裂が生じれば、中国は典型的な分割統治の機会を与えられると考えている。ロシアに関してトランプ氏はロシアによりのクリミア半島の併合を認めると言ったことがあり、NATOもいらないと言ったからおそらくロシアによるバルトの国々への侵入も認める可能性が否定できない。同様に中国のSCSの軍事的拡張も認める可能性がある。中国はトランプ氏の当選を応援するのは当然であろう。

 ３．日本にて政治的な展望

 最近の与党圏の参議院選挙の圧倒的な勝利により、安倍政権の権力は強化される。内閣改造はそれほど大きいな変化はなかったが、内閣改造と自民党の役員人事は安倍総理のこれからの意思を示す。１番注目を集めるのは稲田朋美の防衛相の起用である。稲田議員の靖国神社の頻繁の参拝や領土問題についての発言（彼女は竹島の視察を目的に韓国に訪れるつもりだが、韓国政府は入国を拒んだ事件があった）や歴史修正主義(南京大虐殺を否定する発言)により悔い改めないと、右翼の政治家として知られているからである。稲田夫人はポスト安倍の後継者になると永田町中で声が上がっているが彼女の防衛大臣としての、安全保障や中国に関する日本政府の立場に影響が強くなるはずである。また、重要な自民党の幹事長に、二階俊博の起用も意義のある決定と言える。稲田議員と対照的に二階氏は親中派だとしられて安倍総理は自分の政権におけるバランスを取ろうとしているかもしれないが、二階と稲田は共通点がある。それは安倍首相の党総裁任期の延長の可能性を認めるという発言をしたことがあるのだ。いうまでもなく安倍首相の任期が長ければ長いほど彼の長年の夢の憲法改正が実現できる日が近づく。参議院の選挙の結果で与党側や改憲勢力の３分の2を超えているから衆参両院で憲法改正案の発議が可能になる。もちろん国民投票が必要であるが、日本中に勢いが高めれば、日本の平和主義の憲法がなくなり、安全保障のパンドラの箱が開くのである。

4.中国に圧力をかける

さてどうやって中国に日米両国は、具体的な圧力をかけるか？両国は同盟的な二国間で、一方的な圧力をかけるはずである。しかし、どちらにもかからず共通の意図がある。それは中国を拘束という狙い。以下、両国の圧力を外交的・政治的と軍事的という二つのカテゴリに分離するのである。

• 外交的・政治的な圧力

—法的要求

アメリカは、中立立場を守ると言いながら米国は、フィリピンの国連海洋法条約（UNCLOS）の要求のような中国への法的要求を支えている。中国の不参加と国際海洋法裁判所の判決への敏感な反抗は、どれぐらいそういう要求に対して中国の立場の脆弱さを示す。国際世論の空想上の裁判所において 中国のフィリピンのUNCLOSの要求への反応は納得性がないと言っていいでしょう。なぜならまず中国はUNCLOSを批准したので国際海洋法裁判所の判決を受け入れるはずです。以下中国のその判決に対しての反抗についてもっと意見を出すけれどもとにかく元駐米大使柳井俊二のITLOSの裁判官の選択は依怙だしフィリピンがITLOSの裁判官へ賄賂を贈るというような申し立ては不似合いではないかなと思う。今後の中国への法的要求に日米両国は絶対支持する。

—東南アジアへの日米の支援

中国の海洋領土権の主張に反抗している東南アジアの国々への日米からの支援は当然なことである。米国政府からの金銭的な支援は少ない（「予算のほこり」）が、いうまでもなくアメリカの軍事の存在感はそれを十分埋め合せている。であるにもかかわらず、２０１５年に米国政府はASEANとの関係は「戦略的パートナーシップ」にアップグレードしてASEAN地域フォーラム（ARF）に強い支持を示している。ARF の優先課題はなんと「信頼醸成」から「積極的な外交」へ移りつつあって中国の海上拡張を念頭に置いてSCSにて「ルールに基づく秩序」の擁護を強調するようになっている。穏やかな態度をとりながら今年の七月のASEAN声明ではITLOSの裁判に全然触れていないが、ちょうど一周間後、米訪中のシンガポールのリー・シェンロン首相が、初めて東南アジアの首脳として、ホワイトハウスで開かれた公式晩餐会を受けた。ASEANの中でシンガポールは中国に対しての態度は軍事的な面で、かなり親米よりな為、その待遇は非常に象徴的だと言える。

—日本からのASEANへのインフラと能力構築の支援

今まで歴代の政権は政府開発援助（ODA）を絶対平和的な利用することにしていたが、平成２５年１２月における安倍政権の日本の初めての「国家安全保障戦略」においてODA の「戦略的利用」が要求されている。意義ある変化として「戦略」という言葉の出現で従来のODAは、日本の政府の狙いは関係せずに、ただ被援助国の発展のためだけであり、これからのODAは政府の外交的や安全保障的な政策に沿って行われる。さらに平成２７年２月における安倍内閣は、改定された政府開発援助大綱を決定した。その新しいガイドラインは、外国の軍事へのODAを許可し、その軍事へのODAは、災害救援などという非軍事利用という条件を付けるが、実際には、援助された装置や訓練が、何の目的に使われるか分かるはずもない。（ODA 大綱の名称も変更で「政府開発援助大綱]から「開発協力大綱」にした。重要なのは「援助」から「協力」という変更で付帯条件なしという感じから見返りという意味合いになってしまうのである。)例えば医療トレーニングコースの得た知識や能力は戦場で使える。その新しいODA大綱の発表のための記者会見において安倍首相は日本の援助は「法の支配」を守るためだと強調して、明らかに中国のECS/SCSの「不法的」活動に暗示していた。実際に2013年台風３０号ハイエン発生後１，１８０自衛隊の部隊は、災害救援のためフィリピンへ派遣されたが、そのレスポンスは「中国を抑えるため」 (日本政府の関係者)という下心があったようである。

 アジアの中で一番大きな日本からの援助の被援助国は中国と熱々と論争しているヴィエトナムとフィリピンである。従来の援助は能力構築とインフラ整備に中心して、それは中国に何らかの圧力をかけるのだろうか？直接なプレッシャーはないが、言うまでもなくその大勢のODAの金銭で、日本や現地において訓練を受けた技術者や科学者は、自国の軍事の発展は重要な人材であり、インフラの面では日本援助により賄った事業だから自国の資金を使わずに、軍事の発展に注ぎ込むことができる。つい最近、日本はマニラの鉄道の建設のために24億ドルの融資をフィリピンと約束した。その上、送電網,空港や港の建設など日本のODAにより造られたインフラは直ぐ軍事的な利用へ変換できるのである。

• 日本の軍事的な圧力

安倍政権は日本の軍事関係の政策に三つの変更を実現しました。第一は閣議決定により集団的自衛権の行使が容認。第二武器輸出規制の緩和だ。第三外国軍をODA支援対象になるようになった。

—集団的自衛権の行使容認

平成２６年七月における安倍政権は集団的自衛権の行使をできるようになる憲法の解釈を変え、自衛隊部隊を地理的な制限なく派遣できるようにした。集団的自衛権の行使に基づいて海上自衛隊の艇艦はSCSにて攻撃された米海軍の艇艦を守ることができる。この集団的自衛権の行使容認は、日本の憲法改正への第一歩としての意味を持つ

­—武器輸出規制緩和

平成２６年 四月に安倍内閣が閣議決定で、武器輸出は条件を満たせば認められるようになった。それを受け、すでに三菱重工業は潜水艦や島を奪還のための水陸両用強襲車を外国に売ろうとしている。しかしそういう大規模な軍事機器より画像センサのような、小さいハイテクの部品を売るかもしれない。

—外国軍にODA

上記のように日本のODAの中で、べエトナムやフィリピンにその国の情報・監視・偵察(ISR)能力を強化するために沿岸警備隊用の巡視船（ヴィエトナムに6隻, フィリピンに10隻)をODAの円借款で提供する。明らかにこの援助は中国のSCSの活動を控えると言う目的である。

—日本の軍事力強化

さて日本の軍事関係政策の変更とともに日本の軍事力自身はどう変わるか。日本の２０１５年度防衛予算は１、５％増加で4兆9800億円になった。その中２０機PC−３哨戒機の配備に３５００億円、新しいAegis駆逐艦の建造に1680億円、６機F−３５戦闘機に１０３０億円に確保されている。その航空機と艦船は全てECS/SCSに配備される。特に強化されているのは南西諸島の離島でISRと迎撃ミサイル能力だ。２０１６年の三月に与那国島で陸上自衛隊の駐屯地と沿岸監視隊を創設して、その部隊のレーダーでECS全体とSCSの北の方の中国の船舶や航空機の活動を監視できる。南西諸島の離島を奪還のため防衛省は日本の初めての水陸機動団水陸機動団を創設した。日本全域に弾道弾迎撃ミサイルの能力を強化して、THAAD(終末高高度防衛ミサイル)を米国から導入すれば効果的な３層BMDになる。第１層はTHAAD,第２は艦載搭載するミサイル（全てのAegis６隻にはRIM-161スタンダード・ミサイル3は搭載される見込み）、第３はPAC３地対空誘導弾パトリオットミサイル。

 

中国が尖閣諸島の周辺にてエスカレートになっている活動に対して２０１６年の四月に海上保安庁は、巡視船１２隻が尖閣諸島の専門任務になる。更に、２０１５年の五月のSCSにおける日比共同軍事訓練を継続し、両政府は最近の国際仲裁裁判所の判決が下したばかりでSCSで、共同訓練を行うことに合意した。言うまでもなく、そういう高まった巡回や共同軍事演習は、中国に圧力を加えるための

意図であるが、効果はどれほどなのか。

やはり一番プレッシャーをかけるのは、核兵器のようだ。中国人民解放軍は、日本の核兵器の開発をかなり神経質のようである。人民解放軍の将校を対象に「国防参考」に乗った２０１４年四月８日に日付の記事で、日本は必要な技術を持っているし核兵器製造の大量の原料を所有しているからいつでも核兵器を作れることを予測している。要するに物凄い圧力になるのは核兵器だ。日本では核兵器の開発について公の議論はゼロなのに、米紙のワシントン・ポストの記事によると、安倍首相はオバマ米国大統領の核先制不使用の宣言にとても反対しているし、安倍政権は核兵器の開発の基礎を築くということは否定できない。

• 日米軍事協力

主要な中国に圧力をかける原点は、もちろん日本における米軍基地であるが、２０２０年までに米海軍の全ての艦船と飛行機の６０％は、日本を含めて太平洋に配置されるという見込みだ。日本における主な米軍勢は以下の通り、

—海軍：横須賀に配置の第7艦隊（空母打撃群などを含め）、

—空軍：嘉手納や三沢飛行場に配備の１３０機の戦闘機、

—海兵隊：沖縄に配備の危機対応の第3海兵遠征軍など。

２０１５年に日米防衛協力のための指針の改革は、非常に意義のある展開で、要はEDC/SCSを含めて世界のどこでも「切れ目のない日米共同の対応」ができるようになる。これを受けて２０１５年のAPEC首脳会議で安倍総理は、オバマ大統領に米国のSCSの航行の自由作戦を支えるために日本は艦船を派遣すると報道された。

• 米国の軍事的な圧力

上記のSCSにおける今まで（２０１６年五月10日）三番目の米軍の航行の自由作戦（FONOP)は、一応一番直結な圧力の手段だ。それに加えて以下の施策を実施すると考えられる。

—フィリピンとベトナムへの軍事協力：２０１６年三月にアメリカが過去には米国の軍事存在を激しく抵抗したフィリピン政府と、米軍のフィリピン五ヶ所の軍事基地が、改めて永久的な存在と合意した。そのフィリピン基地から米軍隊が南沙諸島などに派遣できるようになるとともに、アメリカはその基地の能力を強化するために設備拡張・建設に支援する見込みだ。米国はかなり沿岸警備隊のカッター、軍装備品などをフィリピンに提供している。２０１６年三月から中国への警戒を強めているためにSCSにおける米比共同哨戒活動を始めた。米軍隊が展開されるAntonio Bautista Air Baseが位置しているパラワン島は南沙諸島のミスチーフ礁(美济礁)からただ２１７キ離れている為、米海兵隊は中国の九段線のすぐ側パラワン島に島上陸の訓練ができる。さらに有力のジョン・マケイン米国上院議員らはスカボロー礁（黄岩岛）が、米比相互防衛条約の対象範囲となると出張し、そうであれば尖閣諸島と同様に中国軍がスカボロー礁沖にフィリピンの海軍艦艇などを攻撃すればアメリカはフィリピンを守る義務になる。

前の敵は友になる歴史の皮肉の典型的な例で、アメリカは、この頃ベトナムと軍事協力を強化している。２０１６年五月にアメリカはベトナムに対する武器禁輸措置を全面的に解除して、最初にベトナムのISR能力を強化するためにISR用の装置を売却。さらに米海軍は重要な深層水のカムラン湾の港湾施設へのアクセスとなる見込みである。カムラン湾の戦略上の立地に鑑みて、これは国に圧力をかなり加えるはずである。

無論アメリカは上記の他に圧力作戦がある。例えば、米海軍は空母打撃群をSCSにおいて何ヶ月も配備できると共に、米空軍の爆撃機を人工島周辺へ飛行させられ、米海兵隊は遠征機動基地（EMB）をSCSに建設する選択機がある。「空は限界である。」

 

５．これから

 

さて中国は今後どういう風にそのアメリカと日本からのあらゆる外交的・政治的や軍事的な圧力を対応するか？上記に述べたとうり、この間の国際海洋法裁判所の判決への激しい反抗は、フィリピンの賄賂、日本のバイアスなどを中心にしたが、ただわめき散らすという感じであった。確かに、その判決を受け入れるべきだと出張している日本は竹島の問題について、国際司法裁判所で決めるべきだという日本の立場と同様に、尖閣諸島の問題についても領土問題があると認めず、国際司法裁判所に訴える理由はないという矛盾の立場に対して、中国が十分反論する余地がある。ECS/SCSにおける中国にプレッシャーをかけているアメリカに対して、昔自分は西半球に経済的・軍事的な支配を広げたと出張したモンロー主義に断ったわけだから、どうして中国は自分の目の前の海にて同じようなことができないかという声ある。しかし、そういう議論はあまりにも１９世紀の植民地主義的な考え方だしベトナムやフィリピンの国民の存在を無視する。地球温暖化問題で中国は「お前たち西洋国は経済発展のため工場から廃棄物を凄く出したから我々は同じ権利を持っている」と言えば同様なレベルである。他にもっと解決に繋げる反応にすればいいではないか。少しでも相手の領土権の主張を認めてECS/SCSの豊かな資源を共同開発する以外の方法はあるのだろうか。

 Photo: U.S. Pacific Fleet via flickr

 

 

Philippe Valdois, February 1, 2016

 

Introduction

2015 has been marked by the resurgence of political activism in Japan and the appearance of a new generation of activists for the first time in decades.

Did this happen in reaction to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s policies, in particular with the adoption of a secrecy bill and the decision to reinterpret Article 9 of the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense or, more generally, to the perceived idea that the actual government, with the affiliation of most of its members with a revisionist group, promoting a return to the old Imperial system, was becoming a threat to democracy and the constitution, or to other factors ?  

 

In my opinion, there is no clear-cut answer but the process of “normalization” advocated by Shinzo Abe and others before him might have been the major factor of public discontent, a large number of Japanese citizens seeing the latest moves by the government as a de facto coup d’état.

I will examine the emergence of SEALDs and other civil movements and will comment on various op-eds recently published in answer to government pressure targeting the media and the academic world directly or by proxy.

However, the big question that might be left unanswered at the end will be to know if and how the emergence of such movements can announce or facilitate the formation of a new political left able to balance the influence of Shinzo Abe and its LDP.

I should point at parenthetically at the growing disconnection between the concerns of the citizens and the powers that be around the world as seen at Davos and at other summits. Global warming and inequalities, along with others concerns are not addressed by the world leaders as they should be. This is also happening in Japan where the distrust for the political class manifests itself in the low voting participation. At the same time, to protect their privileges and assets, and silence dissident voices the world elites are enacting more and more security regulations. Japan, in a way, seems to follow this global trend, having implemented various new border control systems, following the terrorist attacks in New York City on 9-11, for example. However, this should not lead us to conclude that Japan does not entertain its own agenda as we will see later.

 

The following comes with a caveat: it is not my intention to give a balanced view of the respective positions and opinions of the Japanese left and right on certain issues. The official position of the government is supported and propagated by various medias and is readily available on various ministries’ websites, so I will not elaborate on it. In fact, the argument of fairness has been advanced by various medias to cover what amounts to neglect of their professional duty of informing or questioning the leadership, or to cover encouragement of self-censorship in view of preempting retaliation.

Sources of discontent

I suggested in a previous essay that Japan was facing drastic changes. I mentioned Prime Minister Abe and his associates’ efforts to implement a patriotic education system reminiscent of the Imperial system of indoctrination and to change the constitution, starting with its “reinterpretation.”

Those efforts, such as the railroading of the new security bills, might have backfired to only a small extent, given the continuous apathy of the electorate, or its lassitude, and despite the Summer 2015 largest demonstrations to take place in front of the Diet building since the early 60s’, when a great number of intellectuals and students had mobilized against the revised Security Treaty signed by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi[1], the grandfather of the present prime minister. Similarly, the antinuclear movement following the March 2011 nuclear catastrophe does not seem to have been effective enough in changing the pronuclear stance of the LDP government.

However, it might have signaled the start of a greater involvement in politics of civil society in general, or at least the youth element. Such involvement can be seen in the emergence of SEALDs as a catalyst for other groups.

To understand better how SEALDs and the reemergence of civic movements came to be, we need to go back two decades or so. I mentioned both in the introduction and in my previous essay the concept of “normalization” as an important factor. Here we need to examine how this concept’s definition changed over time.

For that, we can go back to the late 1980s’ and early 1990s’ and the PKO Law of 1992[2]. Japan decided at that time that it should be more involved in the UN peacekeeping operations.

Later in 1999, Japan enacted its Contingencies in Surrounding Areas Law[3] focused on North Korea’s threat and with the aim of reinforcing the security alliance with the United States.

Then, came September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Laws[4]. The question was then how to cooperate with the US in their war in the Middle-East.

As Professor Koichi Nakano[5] mentioned in a public lecture untitled Civil Society Activism and Japan’s Security Policy: What Future for Japanese Democracy?[6], and given on November 20^th, 2015, those three sets of bills constitute the background for the current security policy change.

 

In the late 80s’ and early 90s’, collective self-defense was not promoted by those advocating a growing presence of Japan on the international scene. the mood was more optimistic and the accent was on reconciliation with South Korea and China and a greater involvement in international affairs under the framework of the UN.

However, a shift took place towards a more US dependent approach to foreign policy in the later half of the 1990s’, especially with the Koizumi-Bush period following the terrorist attacks in New York City on 9-11 and the progressive deterioration of relations with South Korea and China.

Since Shinzo Abe’s return to power in 2012, various attempts have been made by his administration to change the constitution. According to Professor Nakano, we could expect another major attempt by Abe’s government this year. It is important to note that under the Designated Secrets Law[7], the public and most parliamentarians might not be fully informed of the reasons why the National Security Council might decide that Japan should get involved in a conflict along the US. A dangerous situation indeed.

In the context of “normalization” there is in addition, since the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi, a strong will to please the US in various domains such as trade by not joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, signing up for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, etc. This might be seen as a way to gain some benefits from Washington, including a certain degree of tolerance regarding the revisionist agenda of Shinzo Abe. I wonder, however, to what extent the US government would let Japan’s Prime Minister Abe go in that direction if he and his friends were to criticize too overtly the decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far-East!

Another grievance of the public and telltale of Shinzo Abe’s agenda is the bullying medias and intellectuals are confronted with in Japan. The campaigns some journalists have been subjected to recently are nothing new. A while ago a Journalist from Asahi Shimbun suffered tremendous pressure from the far-right[8]. It is also common knowledge that even if political cartoons are authorized (contrary to a number of other Asian countries) many subjects are taboo in Japan and ridiculing publicly a politician would expose the entertainer and his or her employer to reprimand or worse. It seems nevertheless that the situation is getting worse, as quite a few foreign medias have noted.

Hiroko Kuniya, an extremely talented TV anchor, is the latest casualty, but others working for TV stations and newspapers have also suffered. As Andrew Horvat says in Jeff Kinston’s article[9] about the ouster of Hiroko Kuniya: “… the people in power in Japan today would prefer to have Japan’s TV screens populated by colorful clowns and polite news readers.” Nothing surprising if not for the extent to which the Japanese government is ready to go to make this happen. As I mentioned previously the argument of neutrality is advanced both in the medias and in academic circles, creating a culture of fear and self-censorship, but it might be in part the product of journalists being numbed into obedience through compulsory membership in complacent press clubs and the long tradition of asking scripted questions[10].

The emergence of a New Civil Society Activism: SEALDs

SEALDs, or Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy-s, is a student movement but does not represent all students. It is in fact fairly small in membership but has been playing an important role as catalyst.

It started in 2011 with an anti-nuclear, anti-hate, anti-secrets law and anti-security bills program focused on democracy.

It is composed for the most part by students who are not left-wing but liberal and individualists. They have both Japanese and English websites[11], Facebook and Twitter accounts.

They have been able to galvanize the public into action and shared with some older groups the task of organizing regular walks and demonstrations against the government since early 2015.

Other groups mobilizing against the government include the Nichirenben, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations[12], Save Constitutional Democracy Japan group[13], that is known as Sogakari Kodo or Old School (composed of seasoned activists groups, union members, etc.), Asukawa, an association of young lawyers, and Mothers against War.

In fact, I also saw protesting in front of the Diet building many members of the Komeito, the junior coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party who did not share their party line regarding the security bills.  

Those are for Japan’s Liberals reasons to be optimistic. In fact, new groups keep emerging like the Association of People’s Movement to take back constitutional politics[14], which includes scholars and members of SEALDs, on January 19, 2016, and the announcement of the launching of a think tank called ReDemos[15][16].

Will this be enough to mobilize the electorate and stimulate the opposition?

It is difficult to say. There are charismatic figures such as Taro Yamamoto[17] who has started his political career on an anti-nuclear platform and has supported SEALDs and other groups from inside the political system, but there is a need for the opposition to offer new economical alternatives to Abenomics and to show unity.

Some other important issues need some ironing out in terms of collaboration. This is the case for the opposition to the high concentration of US military bases in Okinawa and the controversies surrounding the relocation plan of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from Ginowan City to Nago inside Okinawa[18], a plan opposed by the actual governor. People of Okinawa are more and more vocal about discrimination and it will take efforts for the left on the mainland to establish a serious dialog and find common strategies to address this major problem. The position of the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan is ambiguous concerning this issue since its president, Katsuya Okada, as foreign minister in 2009 and 2010, was a major actor of the poorly conducted negotiations at that time[19][20] 

Conclusion

There is hope for Japanese Liberals, but there is also a race against time since Shinzo Abe seems determined to leave behind a legacy. The next step will be the Upper House elections, slated for Summer 2016, when Prime Minister Abe hopes to secure the help of smaller right-wing parties to win a super majority enabling him to start a constitutional revision process[21]. Meanwhile, the protests continue and the resistance to the plans to rewrite the constitution organizes itself[22]. Taro Yamamoto might be the model of a new generation whose attitude, as he has repeatedly shown in parliament and elsewhere, raising the ire of traditional politicians, seems to go counter to the common idea that Japanese will generally embrace conformity for fear of standing out[23].

A welcome change.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobusuke_Kishi

[2] http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html

[3] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/22/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-eyes-greater-support-for-u-s-forces-in-contingencies

[4] http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html

[5] http://www.fla.sophia.ac.jp/professors/nakanokoichi

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QSAL8kCqXXA

[7] http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-act-on-protection-of-specially-designated-secrets/

[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/world/asia/japanese-right-attacks-newspaper-on-the-left-emboldening-war-revisionists.html

[9] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/01/23/commentary/hiroko-kuniyas-ouster-deals-another-blow-quality-journalism-japan/#.Vq84LscWG34

[10] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/19/national/media-national/murky-call-hardball-interview-chief-cabinet-secretary-suga/#.Vq8_AscWG34

[11] http://sealdseng.strikingly.com

[12] http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2015/150919.html

[13] http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201506250066

[14] http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160120/p2a/00m/0na/016000c

[15] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/15/national/sealds-members-next-step-launching-think-tank

[16] http://redemos.com

[17] https://www.taro-yamamoto.jp

[18] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relocation_of_Marine_Corps_Air_Station_Futenma

[19] http://www.japanupdate.com/archive/index.php?id=9978

[20] http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201211190068

[21] https://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201601130022

[22] https://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201601240030

[23] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2012/03/04/people/actor-in-the-spotlight-of-japans-antinuke-movement/#.Vq9hY8cWG34

Photo: Moyan Brenn via flickr

                                  by Philippe Valdois

On August 14, 2015, a day before the 70th anniversary of the Japanese defeat in WW2, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed the nation. The stakes were high, as Japan needed to restore trust with its neighbors. It also needed to show it could face history, since it would hardly be possible to expect the future to be shared by equal Asian partners without a common understanding of history. This statement also came at a time when there is growing concern both inside and outside Japan that various recent government initiatives to revise the Constitution, reinforce the military or muzzle the media, among other things, are but the tip of the iceberg, and that maybe the real objectives of the government in recent years have been much more ideological in nature than the public might have been led to believe when the focus was on Abenomics.

 It is my understanding that there are concerted efforts to implement long-term societal changes under the leadership of Shinzo Abe and that behind the talk about making Japan a “normal” country lies, in fact, for some members of Japan’s elite, a deep dissatisfaction with post-war democratization, and a deep-seated nostalgia for the pre-war Imperial system. The latest statement by Shinzo Abe only confirms what many observers, scholars and journalists have recently pointed out.

 Are these efforts going to succeed or fail? Scholars and specialists have diverging opinions on the question. To decide if there really is a shift in society towards the right, if this shift is a new phenomenon or the emergence of deep-seated prejudice and xenophobia, we need to evaluate the relative influence of political and ideological forces, including public opinion. Also, there is no doubt that the media and the educators have to be reined in if ultraconservatives have a chance to see their long-term strategies and shaping of public opinion succeed. Education in particular is becoming the main stage where the fight for winning the souls of the future generations is taking place. Keeping in mind Shinzo Abe’s anniversary statement, we will start by going back in time to the San Francisco Treaty.

In a subsequent essay, we will introduce some of the counteracting forces we can find in the academic world, in grassroots movements, in the press and nowadays in a increasingly-vocal segment of the young population.

The San Francisco System Eight Major Problematic Legacies According to Dr. John W. Dower

The San Francisco Treaty, or Peace Treaty with Japan, was signed on September 8, 1951, along with the Security Treaty. Those treaties were to mark the beginning of what Prof. Dower calls the “San Francisco System.”

John W. Dower, MIT professor emeritus of Japanese history said:

 “The disputed islands, the containment-of-China accusations, even the bitter “history issue” involving recollection of imperial Japan’s militarism all have toxic roots in the early years of the Cold War. Together with other present-day controversies, they trace back to the San Francisco System under which Japan re-entered the post-war world as a sovereign nation after being occupied by U.S. forces for over six years, from August 1945 to the end of April 1952.” [1]

Communist China, the Chinese nationalists in Taiwan and South and North Korea were excluded from the Conference although their people had greatly suffered from Japanese aggression and occupation.

Washington had one major objective, and it was to use Japan in the context of the Cold War for strategic purposes as became clear later clear during the Vietnam War. In exchange for the end of occupation and the protection of the U.S. military, Japan was forced to accept the continuous presence of U.S. bases in Japan.

 As Prof. Dower points out:

 “The corrosive long-term consequences of this post-occupation estrangement between Japan on the one hand and China and Korea on the other are incalculable. Unlike West Germany in post-war Europe, Japan was inhibited from moving effectively toward reconciliation and reintegration with its nearest Asian neighbors. Peace making was delayed. The wounds and bitter legacies of imperialism, invasion, and exploitation were left to fester—unaddressed and largely unacknowledged in Japan. And ostensibly independent Japan was propelled into a posture of looking east across the Pacific to America for security and, indeed, for its very identity as a nation.” [2]

 Prof. Dower goes on identifying height problematic legacies:

 (1) Okinawa and the “two Japans”; (2) unresolved territorial issues; (3) U.S. bases in Japan; (4) rearmament; (5) “history issues”; (6) the “nuclear umbrella”; (7) containment of China and Japan’s deflection from Asia; and (8) “subordinate independence”[3]

I recommend Prof. Dower’s long essay[4] for more information about those issues, which have basically been left unresolved, successive administrations having failed to create a roadmap to address them. Interestingly, Prof. Dower is described indifferently as a Marxist, or liberal, etc. in a critical essay by Tanaka Hidemichi, of the revisionist group Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact[5]. This same group quotes the journalist Henry Scott-Stokes on WW2 various issues on its website, but it appears their methods are far from honest if we are to refer to the reaction of Henry Scott-Stokes[6]!

 Revisionism at work in Japan

 Shinzo Abe’s statement demands that we focus on “history issues,” which are at the center of Japan’s neighbors’ grievances. So far so good, but what was expected, as an apology in the statement, was more precisely the recognition of specific issues related to history, and this did not happen.

 We remember that the U.S. authorities, similarly to what had happened in occupied Germany with Operation Paperclip and Operation Osoaviakhim, had granted immunity to Japanese researchers involved in Unit 731 in exchange for their data on human experimentation.[7] It was much later that scholars, and writers like Shusaku Endo with 海と毒薬 (The Sea and Poison) published works on those experimentations. The role played by the United States in protecting their perpetrators and the silence observed by many parties willing to do so for economical reasons, both in Japan, the United States and the PRC (notably about the Rape of Nanking in the immediate post-war period,) explains in part why it took so long before this issue, forced labor, and the enslavement of women euphemistically called “comfort women” came under the spotlight and became public knowledge.

According to The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) at the United States National Archives:

 “Furthermore, there was more systematic destruction of Japanese records pertaining to war crimes in 1945 in response to specific directives to this effect from Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo than was the case in Germany. It should also be noted that vast quantities of Japanese records were returned to Japan without screening or microfilming.”[8]

 

We might ask ourselves at that point why Japan could not have dealt with its past the way Germany did, opening its records. One argument advanced by the previous Japanese administrations for their refusal to recognize even the veracity of witness accounts of crimes such as had been committed by Unit 731, is to flatly state that such matters had been dealt with between states and through the signing of various treaties. Doing otherwise would have in fact opened the way for financial claims, which was one major reason for not opening the debate about this and other issues, including slave labor[9]… until decades later, when the paucity of survivors would guarantee lesser payments.

Another reason is the nostalgia for the pre-war Imperial system mentioned in the introduction. It is not surprising to see words such as “masochistic view of history” being used by people like Fujioka Nobukatsu in An Analysis of Masochistic Historical Views in Japan (Tokyo, Bungeishunju, 1997) or Tanaka Masaaki in What Really Happened in Nanking (Tokyo, Sekai Shuppan, December 2000). They reflect a vision of Japan as the victim and the accent put on a romantic image of the country and its people.

Contributing to this particular reading of history is the idea that after General Douglas MacArthur absolved the Emperor and his family of any responsibility in WW2 events, he absolved the nation and its people, making it easier for many Japanese to consider those issues as having being resolved.

Moreover, the moral issue is rarely mentioned in Japan, officially or not, except by some grassroots movements, and most of those Japanese who are in favor of apologies are in fact expressing concern for Japan’s own trade and diplomatic relations. Morality is central to the German mind, not so, it seems, for the Japanese.

German racism in WW2 was based on the myth of the Untermensch, the sub-human, developed by the Nazis. By categorically rejecting Nazism as the ideology that had brought misery both to millions of people and its own population, Germany after WW2 also rejected racial discrimination and adopted strong laws against it.

However, regarding Japan, it is only recently that debates have started at the Upper House on an anti-racial discrimination bill[10]. This comes 30 years after Japan has signed the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination. The bill was introduced by the opposition and is opposed by the parties in power. It also has no punitive provisions. So far, the existing laws Shinzo Abe suggests using to fight discrimination do or will do little to dissuade the use of “No Foreigners” signs in front of various facilities, or hate speech directed at foreigners by various racist groups. Is this reluctance to act both regarding crimes of the past and discrimination of the present a symptom of deeply ingrained racism?

For the Japanese during WW2, their country was a divine Empire. We can look at French history and expressions such as “France, the eldest daughter of the Church” to find a similar fantastic (in the etymological sense) notion that a country is destined and mandated by divine right to rule and guide others. The analogy went farther in that such mandate became convenient for the power that be and in that both monarchy in France and the militarists in Japan did not always see eye to eye with the supposed provider of this divine right, as a comparison between Abe’s statement and the Emperor’s speech of August 15, 2015 shows in the case of Japan. Before WW2, Japan’s industrial and military accomplishments became another motive of pride and contributed to a sense of racial superiority. In addition, I would mention two other factors as having contributed to the sense of superiority demonstrated by the Japanese bureaucratic and military elites of that time. One was the rebuttal they had suffered when they tried proposing a statement of racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919. Their hope was to be considered the equals of the other powers of that time, but their proposal was vetoed by the United States and Great Britain. This was a great cause of resentment for Japan. More importantly, cultural differences and misunderstandings, based on a sense of honor contributed to many war crimes and the mistreatment of prisoners that Japanese soldiers considered as weak because of their unwillingness to consent to collective sacrifice, choosing instead to surrender. Strangely, those values had been inculcated quite recently, at the time of the Restoration of Emperor Meiji, concurrently with the establishment of Shinto as a state religion and an instrument of power. Many Japanese embraced this romantic idea of sacrifice and still consider as anathema the relation of dependence that had befallen them when, under the leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, they were forced to accept the protection of their recent enemy and occupier, including the continuous presence of military bases and soldiers. This is one of the keys to understand the resentment we talked about. We see this resentment also transferred towards Japan’s neighbors. However victimized they might feel, it is difficult for them to reject Washington, an ally they grew to depend on not only for their security, as we saw with the San Francisco System, but also for best or worse, for their identity as we will see later.  

Shinzo Abe and Ultra-nationalism

There was no surprise in Shinzo Abe’s statement. It had been made clear by the Prime Minister himself, when he addressed a special joint-session of the U.S. Congress on April 29, 2015, that he would uphold the previous Prime Ministers’ statements, expressing deep remorse. He twice used the word “apology” but to refer to his predecessors’ statements, stating in effect that it had been done, that Japan and its neighbors should move on and that “We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.”

Shinzo Abe’s goal has long been to remove what he considers a burden of guilt for the next generation and a humiliation. His determination to escape from “masochistic history” and restore a sense of pride to Japan has its roots in his proximity to his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, who was the number two in the Manchukuo administration and had been imprisoned as Class A war criminal after the end of WW2. Shinzo Abe considered him as a mentor.

But if he expresses warm feeling towards his grandfather and thus naturally rejects the decisions of the Far-East Tribunal as unjust and illegal, he is also close to a number of revisionist organizations, the most famous, however discrete in its dealings, being the ultranationalist organization “Nippon Kaigi” (Japan’s Conference)[11] created in 1997. A great number of members of Parliament belong to this organization, which promotes a return to the Imperial system, focusing again on the education system, towards more discipline and the teaching of “traditional” values such as sacrifice for the nation (a scary proposition if Japan was to send his children to war under a revised Constitution.)

Identity Crisis

Roland Kelts wrote in 2013 an article entitled “The Identity Crisis That Lurks Behind Japan’s Right-Wing Rhetoric”[12] reflecting my own ideas on the matter. What we see from the Japanese far-right movement in all its diversity is a mix of romantic ideas and nostalgia for the past, of reactions to feelings of inadequacies, and to Japan not being able to address other nations with its own voice. This of course is a legacy from the U.S. occupation of Japan, which has in a way never ended. As Roland Kelts says, “It’s hard to imagine another well-meaning nation with such bad options. If Japan renounces its U.S.-made constitution, it risks belligerent response. If it doesn’t, it has no sovereign identity.”

Having a man like Shinzo Abe in power, who exemplifies those confused feelings at a time of heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, who talks about proactive peace but whose actions and decisions are more reactive than proactive except for his determination to revive the glory of Japan and erase the word guilt, is a motive of concern.

Although looking at the various right-wing groups Shinzo Abe and some of the members of his government are associated with, it would be easy to deduct that Japanese society is shifting to the right, as many commentators suggest, but as we will see in the next essay, the number of citizens participating in grassroots activities in favor of human rights, tolerance towards foreigners, etc., far exceeds, in fact, the membership of Nippon Kaigi or fringe groups such as Zaitokukai. In addition, Shinzo Abe’s approval rate is down, especially among the elder electorate who do not want to see a repeat of the militaristic years preceding WW2

 However, there is a particular phenomenon actually similar to what often happens on the web in general, but especially in the blogosphere and on social networks. It is difficult to anticipate to what extent it reflects the popularity of ultranationalist ideas or a simple fad.

Housewives and stay-at-home mothers spend a lot of time in front of their computers interacting with “netto-uyo” (rightwing activists on the web) sites. Japan Today, on March 6, 2014 mentioned an article of Shukan Gendai (March 8, 2014) where Licca Kayama, a clinical psychiatrist often quoted in the media said:

 “The housewives I’ve encountered who have been drawn to the ‘netto-uyo’ are serious types and hard workers. But they have the sentiment that ‘I do my best but am unappreciated.’ They feel their lives are boring. From thinking ‘There’s something wrong with society,’ this leads them to ‘The media’s not reporting the truth,’ and while these matters have no direct bearing on their lives, they become agitated.”[13]

 By focusing on perceived problems in society that have no direct impact on their lives and embracing a populist position, they can chat without having to exert critical thinking, putting for example the blame for many problems (crime, etc.) on foreigners in general. Xenophobia, which was not previously as pronounced as nationalism, is becoming more prevalent. This phenomenon is quite similar to what happened in the 50’s when women started supporting in mass new religions. One of them in particular was to produce the lay-Buddhist organization Sokka-Gakai behind the New Komei Party, now a member of the coalition in power in Japan! Women can become convenient propagandists as members of parent-teachers associations for example, for the conservative ideology of the Nippon Kaigi, a revisionist movement regrouping a great number of Diet members and government ministers. Such women are also expressing a feeling common among Japanese who are watching China overcoming Japan economically. People in their 50s have worked hard and now see Japan declining and the promises of life-long employment gone. They lay blame on the outside, an easier solution than trying analyzing the root causes of the problems Japan is facing, which include the Amakudari system (or revolving doors politics), and non-transparent archaic forms of management. As someone once said, they worked hard but not smart, not developing skills such as critical thinking, or adopting a more international perspective in the 21^st Century digital age.

The second part of this essay will put the spotlight on many personalities, organizations or grassroots movements representing in fact a much larger segment of Japanese society than its more extreme and vocal elements such as those riding in black trucks, blaring military music in the center of the cities, or suit-wearing members of ultraconservative groups.

 We must concede that Shinzo Abe is sincere in his wish to improve relations with Japan’s neighbors, even if the exact nature of those relations as he see them, and apart from their “peaceful” and “productive” character, remains to be seen. He has shown this wish through his many trips to the Asia-Pacific countries. But on the other hand, he is representing the values of his conservative electorate and his attempts to satisfy both ambitions seem doomed to failure. His strategy to change the Constitution by first proposing a new interpretation of Article 9 and his insistence on upholding the Murayama statement of 1995 while eliminating apologies from his own statement but keeping the word remorse denotes a certain skill with words, but as Michael Cucek wrote in Shisaku[14], Shinzo Abe benefits from having no competition. Cucek suggests reassessing the Cabinet support ratings for Abe as being nominal support as opposed to real.

 Japan is going through a series of rapid changes and I do not see how ultraconservatism with its inherent inertia will be able to win the hearts of the youths who are more willing to embrace change and adopt progressive ideas such as multiculturalism and cultural diplomacy. Shinzo Abe might actually have to fight to stay in power in the months to come.

 

[1]  The San Francisco System: Past, Present, Future in U.S.-Japan-China Relations サンフランシスコ体制　米日中関係の過去、現在、そして未, John W. Dower, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 8, No. 2, February 24, 2014

[2] Idem

[3] Idem

[4] http://www.japanfocus.org/-John_W_-Dower/4079/article.html

[5] http://www.sdh-fact.com/essay-article/354

[6] http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1508692/lost-translation-british-journalist-shocked-japanese-book-he-dictated

[7] The World: Revisiting World War II Atrocities; Comparing the Unspeakable to the Unthinkable, Ralph Blumenthal, The New York Times, March 7, 1999 (http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/07/weekinreview/world-revisiting-world-war-ii-atrocities-comparing-unspeakable-unthinkable.html)

[8] http://www.archives.gov/iwg/reports/japanese-interim-report-march-2002-1.html

[9] http://atimes.com/2015/08/ww-ii-japan-slave-labor-what-to-make-of-mitsubishi-materials-apology/

[10] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/04/national/politics-diplomacy/debate-anti-discrimination-bill-begins-diet/

[11] http://www.nipponkaigi.org/

[12] http://world.time.com/2013/05/31/the-identity-crisis-that-lurks-behind-japans-right-wing-rhetoric/

[13] http://www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/husbands-aghast-at-wives-infatuation-to-rightwing-causes

[14] http://shisaku.blogspot.jp/2015/07/what-has-been-abe-cabinets-real.html