by Bill Lee

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Donald Trump have something in common: brewing scandals. Abe’s has to do with possible influence peddling and Trump’s with the Russian interference in the US elections. The common thread between them is that it is difficult to prove actual direct involvement by either of them.

In Japan the Abe scandals center on what is called sontaku seiji (忖度政治). In the dictionary definition of the word, sontaku means “to suppose, to conjecture, to assume.” But in this context, sontaku means to try to curry favor with higher-ups by anticipating what you think they want and acting proactively without waiting for instructions. The fishy and creepy nursery school operator, Yasunori Kagoike, who is at the center of the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, accused bureaucrats of being the cause of the sweetheart land deal that saw him acquire land for a nursery school at a cut rate because they were trying to please, and thus curry favor with, Abe, who supported Kagoike. Sontaku is supposed by Japanese to be a uniquely Japanese (or Chinese, since the word first appears in a Chinese poem) practice, probably because of the suggestion of unspoken communication.

But we can see a good example of sontaku in America. The Trump election team is suspected of being involved in some sort of collusion with the Russians, yet no hard evidence has so far surfaced to substantiate the claim. And none likely will. We can very easily see sontaku at work here as Trump underlings, trying to anticipate Trump’s wishes and thus curry favor with him, contacting the Russians to collude in their election hacking. Trump never ordered them to work with the Russians, so his hands are clean, and he will never be implicated.

By the way, despite liberals’ fantasies, Trump will probably be never impeached. Even if he were, he would never satisfy liberals’ fervent wish to see him reflect on his transgressions, or to show any remorse for his transgressions. It would be a very unsatisfying scene. Trump would likely just shrug, and say, “So I was impeached. Life goes on. Being president wasn’t such a great gig anyway. I’m going to build some golf courses.” Any bets on Trump winning a second term?

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By Bill Lee

How can countries persuade other countries to do what they want? The recent election in South Korea of Moon Jae-in as president will provide an interesting case study to answer that question. An activist-lawyer, Moon follows in the line of South Korea’s two past progressive presidents, Kim Tae-chung and Roh Moo-hyun. Although a liberal, Moon will likely find it difficult to reverse many of the policies of the last decade of South Korea’s conservative governance and promote progressive-like social welfare programs because of various constraints on him. For one, Moon won only a little over 42 percent of the vote, hardly an overwhelming vote of bedrock support. Moreover, according to South Korean law, he cannot even be certain of his Cabinet nominations since they must be approved by the national legislature.

First, Japan is keenly interested in which way Moon will turn in Japan-ROK relations. The previous progressive presidents, Kim Tae-chung and Roh Moo-hyun, took different stances towards Tokyo. Kim was conciliatory, willing to partially shelve the history problem; indeed, he proposed the joint study by both countries into the reading of their past history. Roh was more hardline, particularly regarding the sex-slave problem. The question is which tack Moon will take. Moon has called for a renegotiation of the sex-slave agreement between Seoul and Tokyo, but will he stick to that line? His position, now that he is president, is fluid, and it will be interesting to see how Tokyo can persuade him to keep the agreement and defuse the situation.

China will naturally also have its sights set on the Moon administration. The big issue is the land-based missile defense THAAD system, whose deployment in South Korea has enraged Beijing. China sees THAAD not as a deterrence against North Korea but as a threat to its own missile launch capability since its X-band radars could peer 2,000 kilometers into China. Beijing reacted by laying unofficial sanctions on South Korean goods and companies, calling for boycotts of South Korean products and tours to South Korea by Chinese citizens. Thus China has levied sanctions on both North and South Korea. Xi Jinping clearly dislikes Kim Jong Un. Could Pyongyang end up believing that it needs its nuclear arsenal not for defense against the United States but against China? Is that too farfetched? Moreover, with China’s sanctions and anger over the THAAD deployment, could Seoul actually begin to see THAAD as a deterrence not against North Korea but against China? In other words, could this be a trigger for Korean unification?

Kan Kimura, a professor at Kobe University and an expert on Korean Peninsular affairs, has pointed out in various articles that before activists of Moon Jae-in’s generation were “leftists,” they were “ethno-nationalists” who wanted to unify the two Koreas. Moon is reportedly keen to restart dialogue with Pyongyang. Kim Tae-chung of course launched the conciliatory Sunshine Policy towards North Korea. Two envoys that Moon sent to Japan and China are both former Kim Tae-chung associates. Will Moon’s “ethno-nationalist” blood heat up or at least soak in more sunshine?

How will China try to persuade South Korea to drop THAAD, by heavy-handed pressure and sanctions, or more diplomatic means? The future direction of the Korean Peninsula could depend on it.

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Photo by Startup Digital via Flickr

By Bill Lee

Tensions have been ratcheted up to a near fever pitch in East Asia, to the point where Tokyo’s biggest subway company temporarily stopped its trains as a panicked precaution when North Korea launched another missile. But China has proposed a reasonable — though familiar — proposal for ending the crisis, and even President Donald Trump has done his part to move the situation in the right direction.

China has put forth its “suspension-for-suspension” proposal and “dual-track” approach. The “suspension-for-suspension” idea calls for North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for the suspension of US-ROK joint military exercises, or vice-versa. Then the United States and North Korea work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a peace treaty in parallel. The plan seems to be the only real way to proceed. North Korea of course hates the joint military exercises right on the other side of their border. It is not difficult to see why. With memories of B-52s flattening all of its cities in the Korean War, Koreans are naturally loathe to see demonstrations of short-range attack capabilities aimed at them and still-flying B-52s, B-1 Lancer bombers, B-2 stealth strategic bombers, and F-35 attack fighters tearing around in nearby skies, not to mention hearing that the Navy Seal Team 6, which took out Osama bin Laden, and a Delta Force squadron are also participating in the military exercises, presumably as a precursor to a “decapitation” operation on Pyongyang. Nothing could possibly make North Korea want to develop its nuclear arsenal more to defend itself as these warm-ups on its border for an invasion.

What North Korea has repeatedly said is that it wants assurances of its security through a peace treaty with the United States ending the Korean War. And that is where Donald Trump has blundered in. Following up on his campaign willingness to share a “hamburger” with Kim Jong Un, Trump said at the end of April that he would be “honored” to meet the young North Korean leader. Liberals suffering from the Trump Derangement Syndrome see everything that Trump does or says is horrible and reject anything coming from the White House. But meeting directly with Kim Jong Un with the lure of a peace treaty in the offing is the one action that would give the young dictator the prestige and assurances to convince him to stand down his nuclear program.

Of course, there are numerous counterarguments against the Chinese dual-track approach and suspension-for-suspension proposal. The American military says that the military exercises are necessary to prepare for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, but that is nonsense. Naturally, it would be better for the military forces to practice together as close as possible to North Korea, but it is not essential. With the computerization of flight and ground combat operations now, they could practice literally anywhere with good effect. And the objection to meeting directly with Kim Jong Un because it would reward him for “bad behavior” can be countered by looking at America’s own behavior towards North Korea over the years. And the argument that Kim could not be trusted to live up to an agreement assumes that no deal could ever be struck with North Korea. Imagine this: a state dinner for Kim Jong Un at the White House. Peace.

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