Some Thoughts on the Current Situation in the DPRK—An Interview with Bill Lee

RG-21 contributor Bill Lee has been a watcher of the goings on in the DPRK for many years. Recently he has turned his attention to China in addition to his main area of interest and specialty which is Japan. This week we caught up with Bill by email to get his take on recent developments in the DPRK.

First sanctions. The greater world community including the United Nations is calling for and applying sanctions on North Korea.  Realistically, Bill, do you think these sanctions have any hope at all of influencing Kim Jung-un or the policy makers in the DPRK?

Sanctions and embargos have been imposed on the DPRK for over half a century but have never worked. Sanctions against South Africa were effective because just about the entire world condemned Pretoria and the white population was a minority. The freezing of Iran’s foreign bank assets was effective because their bank accounts were easily identifiable and the sanctions put a real strain on Iran’s potentially vocal middle class. However, neither of these conditions fit North Korea since Pyongyang’s bank accounts are supposedly more diffuse and hidden, abetted by Chinese banks, and the bulk of the North Korea population is so impoverished they won’t notice more sanctions or will be able to put up with further hardship.

North Korea continues to develop its  nuclear and missile technology. Do you see any scenario where the US, Korea and Japan will say “Enough” and take some pre-emptive action, say a surgical strike on the DPRK?

Certainly the United States would launch a preemptive strike if it were clear that North Korea had an ICBM warming up on the launch pad that intelligence indicated was headed for the US. But absent such an extreme case, it is unlikely — unless Donald Trump becomes president — that the US would launch a preemptive bombing of a nuclear or missile installation because: 1) most nuclear installations are underground in the DPRK and thus difficult to find and destroy, 2) hardware installations can always be rebuilt, and 3) the real danger from the DPRK is not an attack per se but the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. The US and others fear that North Korea will sell actual nuclear devices or technology to terrorists or rogue states. Thus the US would have to kill all of the North Korean scientists and engineers who are building North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. That would probably be impossible.

Finally, what scenario do you see for the rest of 2016 vis-a-vis the DPRK and the world community?

Despite its bluster the KJU regime will, I think, shift its course to a more serious rebuilding of its economy. The nuclear and missile tests were a display for domestic and foreign audiences, but KJU has effectively shelved the songun “military first” policy and embarked on his byungjin policy of pursuing parallel goals of economic and military development. The convening of the Workers’ Party of Korea Congress in May, the first one in more than 35 years, is an indication that KJU will try to plot a new course from now.

 Thanks Bill for taking the time to answer our questions. If our readers have any questions for Bill or comments, please log in and post them below.

 Photo: Rodong Shinmun DPRK