DPRK–No News Is Good News.

                          by David Parmer / Tokyo

Well, it’s not like there isn’t any news from the DPRK in 2019, because there is, in fact, some news. There is just not the same kind of “end of the world nuclear holocaust” news that there was just a short time ago. 

But “normal” is relative, and like the weather in East Asia itself, subject to change without notice. Nevertheless, at mid-year we can look back to February 2019 and a failed US-DPRK summit meeting in Hanoi with two of the world’s biggest summiteers; Donald Trump, President of the United States, and Kim Jong-un, Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Reports indicated that the deal breaker for this meeting was the lifting of US sanctions against the DPRK and the United States’ refusal to do so. Post summit there were no recriminations or finger pointing; everyone just packed up and went home after offering their side of the story.

Things with the DPRK were pretty quiet until May 9, when they fired off two short-range ballistic missiles. Launched from around Wonson, they flew into the Japan Sea, and not over “hostile” territory like South Korea or Japan. It may be that testing was on the schedule for this year regardless, or it might have been a thinly-veiled threat to remind the US and the world that the DPRK has a nuclear arsenal and the vehicles to deliver nuclear payloads.

Things remained quiet until June 12 when Donald Trump announced that on June 11 that he got a “beautiful letter” from Kim Jong-un. Trump expressed his ongoing confidence in the negotiations with the DPRK.

Sources also say that in his letter Kim proposed a third summit with the US. About the same time media reports suggested that Kim’s late brother, Kim Jong-nam was a CIA source. Trump explained that such a thing would not happen during his watch.

And finally to round-out the slow-news cycle, President Xi Jinping will make a trip to the DPRK on June 20 and 21 for discussions with Chairman Kim. This is the first visit of a Chinese leader to the country in 14 years. Clearly both men will have a lot on their minds including how to deal with the United States and its mercurial leader, Donald Trump.

So, looking back, we can see that there has not been much news of a sensational nature from North Korea in the first half of 2019. Maybe the old adage is right: no news is good news.

 

 

Photo: Rodong Sinmun

 

North Korea’s Military – Laughable or Lethal?

N.Korea Uniforms.jpg           (Photo: Army Recognition.com)

                      by David Parmer / Tokyo

 Media reports on the DPRK military are often like the story of the blind men and the elephant. In the story each man grasps a different part of the beast and gives a different and wildly-divergent impression. The 2013 report by the U.S. Defense Department to Congress on North Korea gives an overall view that puts piecemeal reports by the press in a more understandable context.

The North Korean threat to the region is real, and it is an instrument of national policy. The raison d’être for DPRK forces are seen to be twofold; to keep the regime in power and to prevent any significant attack from the ROK, U.S. Japan or an expeditionary force made up of these three countries. At the same time, this capability enables the country to pursue a bellicose, contrarian and concession-extracting foreign policy.

North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. (U.S. Dept. of Defense)

North Korean technology in conventional arms is far behind current world standards but effective. Aircraft date from the 1990s or earlier. While the DPRK has one of the world’s biggest submarine fleets, it along with the Navy (mostly a costal force) are seen as outdated technologically. Vintage Russian and Chinese designs are a big part of the defense mix. The DPRK has the 4th largest military in the world, with 70 submarines,13,000 artillery pieces and substantial armored and infantry units as well as its vintage air force. On paper this looks impressive, but the Pentagon cites serious shortcomings in the military machine of Kim Jong-un. Specifically:

  • Logistic shortages
  • Aging equipment
  • Lack of training

Despite these shortcomings, the threat from the north is credible. It starts with its artillery and rocket forces. Estimates suggest an artillery inventory of 13,000 pieces, many in hardened sites and targeting the territory south of the DMZ and Seoul itself. A second element in the threat is North Korean special forces (SOF). Other sources suggest that as many as 200,000 SOF personnel are on duty. These troops are seen as well equipped, highly motivated professionals capable of being inserted by land sea or air into the ROK to cause havoc and strike high-value targets such as air fields or command centers. Next comes the DPRK’s cyber warfare capability. In a cash-strapped national economy, cyber warfare can deliver a big return on investment. The Pentagon’s report suggests cyber attacks have already been launched on the south, with incidents of Denial of Service (DOS) attacks being attributed to the DPRK. And finally, the tip of Kim Jong-un’s spear is his rocket forces: short and long range missiles, less than sophisticated by world standards, but capable of getting the job done-i.e. threatening both his regional neighbors in China, ROK and Japan, but also the west coast of the United States. It seems that is only a matter of time before North Korea can perfect the launch and re-entry of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a high yield nuclear warhead.

Seen from the Pentagon’s report, the military machine of the DPRK is a well-planned and well thought out instrument of national policy using strategy and limited resources to confront better equipped, better supplied and better trained potential adversaries. And so far this strategy seems to be working just fine.

U.S. Department of Defense Report on North Korea 2013

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf