Taiwan Independence |

Taiwan And The Outcome Nobody Really Wants.

The good news: nobody wants a war over Taiwan. Yet the Taiwan question sits at the head of a list of international situations that threaten the world order in the first quarter of the 21st century. These situations include the Iran nuclear question, Russian intentions in Ukraine, the ongoing war in Syria, and the widespread insurgency in the part of the world that is the vast African Sahel region.

There was not much hope of a radically different approach to US-China relations when the stormy transition from the Trump to the Biden administration was complete. And except for tone there has not been much change. Certainly the tone has changed, the insults, racial prejudice, and right-wing rhetoric are gone, but what the US sees as its fundamental interests in the East China Sea and South China Sea and in the Indo-Pacific has not changed.

President Biden’s approach is to get all of the US allies on the same page and working toward common goals, especially towards China. The recent summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Suga and President Biden underline this policy. Social media posts from Biden and Secretary of State Blinken remind followers that the US is “back.”

If you examine US policy now and in the recent past, not much has changed regarding Taiwan. The US sells arms to Taiwan and intends to continue to do so. The US states that it has an “interest” in a free Taiwan, but has no mutual defense treaties, and has not committed to coming to Taiwan’s defense should an invasion from the mainland take place.

For the foreseeable future the US will do what it has done in looking after its interests in the Pacific for half a century: keep its military presence strong and ready and its alliances intact.

As for China, it will continue to move forward following Xi Jinping’s China Dream. Socialism with Chinese characteristics will continue to be the economic system, China’s military power will continue to expand and become even more sophisticated, and the Belt and Road initiative will continue to expand China’s economic and soft power around the world.

This brings us back to the initial assertion: nobody wants a war over Taiwan. But could one “happen”? One answer might be to look back at the US-Soviet cold war that lasted for several decades without a major incident. Yet for China, border wars have occurred with other large states and have not led to wider wars.

In 1962, China and India had a short border war which saw India be soundly defeated by China which after a short time withdrew its troops. China and Russia had a “shooting” war in 1969 along the Ussuri River that lasted some seven months and resulted in the loss of life on both sides before it was resolved. Ten years later, in 1979, the PRC invaded neighboring Viet Nam for a short but bloody conflict before retreating. Here we see three instances where China was not averse to using military force along its borders to achieve its long-range aims.

China has had short, violent conflicts where it thought it could “win” by taking decisive, aggressive action. The question remains: Is such reliance on short violent conflict “baked in” to Chinese military thinking and strategy? And could China “assume” that it was getting into a short, violent conflict (say the invasion of Taiwan) when in fact the United States was prepared for a long, protracted multi-front confrontation?

In conclusion, there seem to be only two courses of action available right now:

1) The status quo. A new “cold war” where China and the US face off for decades but do not engage in a shooting war.

2) An incident that convinces China that its national interests are being violated (say by Taiwan Independence) that it is forced to take military action and invade.

For the present and the immediate future there seem to be no real solutions to the Taiwan question. Nobody wants a war, but is war inevitable?

Let us know what you think about this important issue.

Photo: ROC (Taipei) Government via flickr

World’s Toughest Job? Johnny Chiang Takes Helm at Taiwan KMT.

On March 9, 2020 Johnny Chiang took office as the new president of Taiwan’s KMT party. (Some might say “China’s KMT”…) Many observers feel that the relatively youthful Chiang, 48, has a rough road ahead. Chiang won a decisive victory over his rival Hua Ling-pin by collecting 68.8% of the vote in a low-turnout KMT election. Chiang immediately promised to reform and revitalize the venerable KMT. He promised to do this in terms of party culture as well structure. There was also talk of a more de-centralized or localized KMT.

What makes his job difficult is not just the stodgy image of the KMT and its membership, but also the fact that over 50% of the population consider themselves “Taiwanese” and not Chinese. Despite Beijing’s slow but steady chipping away at Taiwan’s diplomatic alliances, many young people see Taiwan as already an independent country. Polls show that just about 4% of Taiwanese consider their island part of China.

All of this makes the KMT’s historically pro-Beijing KMT party line a difficult sell to both to younger people as well as to a majority of the Taiwanese. Chiang’s promises of reform and restructuring may indeed succeed, and the KMT may re-invent itself as a leaner, more modern and robust opposition party.

However, the “panda in the room” is the 1992 Consensus and the One-China policy. From the beginning Mr. Chiang has said that in the short term there will be no announcement on the 1992 Consensus and that a committee will decide. His deft dodging of the question harks back to that master politician himself, Deng Xio-ping, who essentially did the same thing decades before when discussing the fate of Taiwan.

With local elections coming in 2022 and presidential elections again in 2024, the KMT will really have to answer the “one China/ 1992 Consensus” question if it is to have any chance of gaining legislative seats or indeed the presidency itself. What might happen is that the KMT drops its historically pro-Beijing posture and gets closer to the DPP’s position on China. This will get them more votes domestically, but then both parties will have to face the displeasure of the CCP.

Just as Mr. Chiang had won decisively this time, incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen’s Democratic Progressive Party had captured the presidency in the January 2020 elections. After a recent election defeat, Tsai Ing-wen had to step down as DPP party head, and it appeared that the KMT would be resurgent in 2020 and that she would be out. But thanks to the unrest and demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2019, Tsai’s fortunes were reversed and she kept a decisive hold on the presidency.

Here we are in 2020 and now it is being said that Johnnie Chiang and the KMT have little chance to gain power. At this point it might seem true, but if Mr. Chiang sets to work with a purpose, all things may very well change in the coming elections. Fate and the Taiwan voters have a way of making things like that happen.

photo: wikimedia commons

Taiwan Elections 2020–A Done Deal?

by David Parmer / Tokyo

January 11, 2020 is Election Day in Taiwan. Voters will be choosing both a president and a number of legislators in Saturday’s election. Will there be any surprises in the election? All indications seem to indicate that there will not be any surprises.

Most bettors would probably put their money on incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen to be re-elected and to defeat her opponents: KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu and People’s First Party James Soong Chu-yu. Barring some last-minute catastrophic change or event, Tsai will get another 4 years. What will be interesting to see is if the opposition parties gain legislative seats or even a significant number of seats.

President Tasi’s first four years have been unremarkable. Perhaps stability in a tense situation is what she brings to the Taiwan-PRC equation.Tsai’s DPP suffered legislative defeat in 2019 and Tsai resigned as party head to take responsibility. What might have followed was a resurgence of the KMT and the DPP being swept away were it not for the social unrest in Hong Kong. Tsai’s long-standing rejection of Beijing’s One Country, Two Systems offer may have a strong resonance among Taiwan voters looking west.

Cross-Strait relations are always in the forefront when considering Taiwan and the PRC. Relations warmed up under KMT President Ma Jing-yeou but immediately cooled when the DPP took over. At present Beijing has barred individual travel to Taiwan, thus damping the tourist industry and eliminating valuable cash inflow. Also, at the same time, President Tsai has had some success in luring Taiwanese companies home to Taiwan.

Improved ties and a melding of the two Taiwan and Mainland economies would be an attractive outcome for Beijing. For cultural and economic reasons the two entities would draw closer. A virtually seamless economy might make One Country, Two Systems more palatable to many people in Taiwan. In addition this would negate the necessity of a costly military option that would bring negative outcomes to all parties involved.

Some reports say that President Tsai and the DPP might be working on improving these cross-Strait relations, and this has stolen some thunder from Han Ku-yu’s program. However, as long as the DPP and President Tsai do not reaffirm the “1992 Consensus” and the “Once China” policy, it is likely that there will be little significant warming of relations between Taiwan and the PRC.

In the beginning of 2020 China has its hands full with the situation in Hong Kong and its public relations fail in convincing the world of what it describes as its fair treatment of its Uighur population. So it is unlikely that Beijing will ratchet up tensions with Taiwan (barring the crossing of the reddest of red lines, i.e. a declaration of Taiwan independence) in the short term, and that it will be pretty much “business as usual” in Taiwan in 2020 following the election of January 11.

Photo: National Renewable Energy Lab via flickr

Hong Kong, Summer 2019 – A Thorny Problem for Beijing.

Hong Kong in the summer of 2019 really is a thorny problem for Beijing. All things considered, it looks like there is no “win” for Beijing, only a “not lose.”

A “Perfect Storm”

A perfect storm of conditions is coming together to make an almost impossible situation in which the Chinese government cannot get a positive outcome. The Hong Kong government has been tasked with dealing with the massive demonstrations opposing the now-defunct extradition bill. The kidnapping of anti-Beijing booksellers in the not-so-distant past gave demonstrators just the ammunition they needed for their protest, as it proved to them that the true purpose of the bill was not to extradite criminals to face justice, but to smother dissent in Hong Kong.

This has been a near impossible situation to deal with for the government of the SAR considering that university students are on holiday and out in full force, and that the world is watching via international media. While there were accusations of excessive force, the demonstrators did enter and vandalize the Legislative Council Building despite police presence.

As of mid-July 2019, protests continue. The second round of protests have been against mainland traders who buy up huge amounts of goods in Hong Kong for resale on the mainland which drives up inflation in Hong Kong. Police and protesters scuffled at a shopping mall and injuries were reported.

Demands from the protesters, in addition to the permanent scrapping of the extradition bill, now include an investigation into police brutality and the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam.

The Use of Minimal Force

At present, it appears that Bejing’s decision is to continue to let the Hong Kong government handle the situation. The use of excessive force by the SAR or the Beijing government would damage the “soft power” that the PRC has been developing for decades culminating in the “Belt and Road” initiative.

The specter of the CCP’s handling of the 1989 Tian An Men Square incident also hangs over the Chinese government. Moreover, those “on the fence” in Taiwan regarding re-unification might be pushed to the pro-independence side if they were to see the PRC clamp down.

And the “no win” situation is just not for the government of the PRC.The protesters who are acting in such a way to preserve the freedom of Hong Kong under the One Country-Two Systems arrangement might just be putting an end to it.

Beijing’s Red Line

China’s long-term strategy is not yet clear. In the short term, the strategy is not to use excessive force. However there is a point where protest becomes anarchy. If anarchy were to ensue, then the PLA would be called in to maintain order. Once order had been restored, those “freedoms” that the protesters were fighting so hard to preserve might be lost forever.

No one knows where the red line is with the powers in Beijing and we are not privy to the thinking of the CCP. But be sure, there is a red line. When the passions of the protesters are aroused, it is unlikely that long-term thinking will prevail, and it is highly likely that anarchy will ensue. When anarchy does ensue, the CCP and PLA will act, and act decisively.

The above outcomes are not good for Hong Kong, and ultimately not good for China. But history has a way of being history, and in Hong Kong and other places around the world we can see history unfold from the comfort of our own homes on big-screen TVs.

What do you think about this matter? Please let us know.

photo: Etan Liam via flickr